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Tales of Faith is also, and perhaps mainly, about an incomprehensible miracle –
that is, an extraordinary event in the world. These lectures constitute an invitation
to meditate on my composite narrative, which contemplates difficult statements
that are contradictory in their effects and, in any case, unbelievable for the agnostic
that I am (Mudimbe 1997: 202).
To Patricia Saegerman, my beloved wife, born in Stanleyville, Belgian Congo
ABSTRACT This piece seeks to address Mudimbe as one of the great creative
cosmopolitan minds of our times. The abundance of autobiographical detail in
his oeuvre allows me to situate him in a particular social and intellectual
context. I read his oeuvre as a sustained attempt at autobiographical self-definition.
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mainly because the fundamental issues of Africa and of African studies today
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Faith is about (i.e. the adventure of clerical intellectualism in Central Africa during
the twentieth century), what meta-contents it contains (i.e. homelessness as
Mudimbe’s central predicament), and what all this means for the practice and
the study of African historic religion, the uninvited guest of Tales of Faith and of
Mudimbe’s work in general. This will allow me to critique Mudimbe’s quest for uni-
versalism which, in my opinion, seduces him to court the very European hegemon-
ism he of all people has so clearly exposed, and to ignore such a way out of his
predicament as the cultivation of an African identity and of African historic reli-
gion might have offered him. Finally, I will compare Mudimbe’s itinerary with
my own; our two paths will turn out to have been amazingly parallel even if they
appear to have ended in opposite destinations.
1. Introduction
Born in 1941 in the former Belgian Congo (subsequently Zaire and Congo), and
now holding appointments at Stanford and Duke in the United States, as well as
being Chair of the Board of the International African Institute, London,
Mudimbe is one of the leading Africanist scholars of our time. His large oeuvre
spans the fields of belles lettres (poetry and novels), philosophical essays, classical
philology, the history of ideas, and edited works assessing the state of the art in
African studies especially philosophy and anthropology. In Africanist circles he
is probably best known for two books which trace the political and intellectual
trajectory of concepts of Africa from Antiquity to the late twentieth century: The
Invention of Africa, and The Idea of Africa (Mudimbe 1988, 1994a). There is no
way in which, in the scope of the present argument, I can begin to do justice to
what is clearly one of the great creative cosmopolitan minds, and one of the
great intellectual and literary oeuvres, of our times. I have to substantially
narrow down the scope of my argument, and I will do so on the basis of a
number of related considerations. In this opening seminar, I think it is fair to
situate Mudimbe in a particular social and intellectual context, and this is not
difficult since his publications abound with salient autobiographical detail – not
to say that his entire oeuvre may be read as a sustained attempt at autobiographical
self-definition.1 One of his latest books, Tales of Faith (1997)2 happens to be an
intellectual and spiritual autobiography disguised as a detached history of ideas
of Central African intellectuals and their work and aftermath in the twentieth
century:
Here, in concluding what is more a reflection on myself than strict research on
African representations of Tales of Faith, I discover that I personally witness to
these tales. The fact that I might not believe in God or in some kind of divine
1 Unfortunately, I have not yet been able to consult his explicitly autobiographical book:
Mudimbe 1994b.
2 Tales of Faith was originally delivered as a series of lectures, the Louis H. Jordan Lec-
tures in Comparative Religion, at the School of Oriental and African Studies in 1993.
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spirit has not prevented me from facing with sympathy the complexity of their fate
and modalities of their cultural appropriations. In fact, the language I speak, the
phenomena I comment upon, and the stories I have chosen to share in these
lectures on conversion are, indeed, not only unthinkable outside of a space circum-
scribed by African elements but also well determined by anthropology and the
colonial saga, as well as the practices and missionizing of Islam and Christianity.
Thus, Tales of Faith is about any post-colonial individual (Mudimbe 1997: 198).
The study of Central African religion has for decades been my own main contri-
bution to African studies. I will therefore eventually link up the discussion of
Mudimbe’s work with my own, towards the end of this article. I will concentrate
on Tales of Faith, but connecting as much as possible to the rest of Mudimbe’s
work, and to his person, to the extent this transpires in the published texts. I will
be very critical, not out of lack of respect and admiration, but because the funda-
mental issues of Africa and of African studies today manifest themselves around
Mudimbe as a central and emblematic figure, and we need to bring out those
issues. After discussing Mudimbe’s surprising methods I shall pinpoint what
Tales of Faith is about (the adventure of clerical intellectualism in Central
Africa during the twentieth century), what metacontents it contains (homelessness
as Mudimbe’s central predicament), and what all this means for the practice and the
study of African historic religion,3 the uninvited guest of Tales of Faith and of
Mudimbe’s work in general. This gives me the opportunity to articulate and
substantiate what I have wanted to say about Mudimbe’s work for a long time. I
will also take the opportunity of comparing his itinerary with my own, and our
two paths will turn out to have been amazingly parallel even if they appear to
have ended in opposite destinations.
2. Mudimbe’s method in ‘Tales of Faith’
These lectures are presented as stories of faith and adventure in intercultural proble-
matics, created by the expansion of Christianity to Africa. [. . .] From the outset I like
to make it clear that I am concerned with how representations of religious systems
bind, fuse or oppose each other in synthetic discourses which, at a different level,
might transmute into metadiscourses, such as those represented by histories of
Christanity and Islam (Mudimbe 1997: ix).
When we try to pinpoint the method by which Mudimbe constructs his texts, the
first thing that meets the eye is that his method is kaleidoscopic and eclectic. In
Tales of Faith, his approach is alternately
3 I prefer the expression ‘African historic religion’ to alternatives such as ‘African tra-
ditional religion’ or ‘African religion’ tout court, in order to denote forms of religious
expression which existed on the African continent more or less independently from
and often prior to the penetration of such world religions as Islam and Christianity, and
which have persisted in changed but recognisable form into the late nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, when many of these forms were drawn into the orbit of professional
outsider description. The word ‘traditional’ has been used in so many ideologically
charged contexts as to have become meaningless; and Islam and Christianity have
ranked among the religious forms of Africa ever since the first millennium of the
common era.
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– definitional (especially the first chapter, where he seeks to define religion);
– autobiographical (passim, and especially parts of chapter 2, where he most
convincingly evokes and clarifies the micropolitics of Central African
education for the priesthood in the middle of the twentieth century by
reference to his own trajectory through this education (Mudimbe 1997:
50–55); micropolitics is here taken in the Foucaultian sense of the
instilling, in individual minds through the construction and manipulation of
small-scale interaction situations, of the preconditions for submission to, or
for the hegemony of, a macro-level system of domination, such as (in this
case) the colonial state and the Roman Catholic church (Foucault 1975);
– exercises in the field of the history of ideas (especially in the second and third
chapter, where he explains the processes through which, in African-based
ethnotheology and philosophy during the twentieth century, the liberation of
difference was effected within the seedbed of missionary Roman Catholicism;
– critical, in the narrowly described manner of the book review neatly
summarising, situating and appraising one or more specific items of
academic or literary production within the limited space and with the
limited ambitions of a published book review;
– deliberately and explicitly hagiographic, in his treatment of Jean Ishaku and of
Alexis Kagame;
– philosophical, when he seeks to articulate difference, identity, knowledge and
representation in the context of his Central African historical narrative.
It is important to realise what this methodological strategy positively amounts to,
and what it does not comprise:
In the first place I must make one general point which I will reelaborate through-
out this paper. The kaleidoscopic effect of the intertwined use of various genres, the
frequent lapses into autobiographical reminiscence, the fact that his book is more of
a heterogeneous (and hasty!)4 collage than a sustained argument, has a deeper
4 Apart from the use of unintegrated scraps of book reviews, the book’s level of copy-
editing is remarkably low. The spelling of proper names in Mudimbe’s work is often
defective; e.g. Blummebach, p. 150, and Blumenback, p. 188, for Blumenbach; cf
Blumenbach’s contemporary Hereen read Heeren (Mudimbe 1992b: 119); Barret, read
Barrett (Barrett 1968) (Mudimbe 1997: 74); Livingston, read Livingstone (ibid. 44) –
p.188 has it correctly; Al-Hjj Umar, read Al-Hajj ‘Umar, (ibid. 90 and index – if he
has the translitteration jihâd whereas that -i- is usually not explicitly represented in
written Arabic, then he should also have the common translitteration Hajj where the
same is true for the -a-). It is not only the copy-editing of Tales of Faith which is
surprisingly defective. Also the bibliography shows major lacunae. The entire, massive
oeuvre of Kagame is cited in the text (Mudimbe 1997: 139–141) without a single entry
in the end bibliography. And a Tempels publication of 1959 is quoted without appearing
the bibliography (ibid. 155); this must be simply the English translation (via the French) of
Bantoe-filosofie; a Sally Falk Moore’s 1984 book is mentioned in the text but not listed in
the bibliography (cf. Moore 1994). Fortes & Dieterlen (1965), African Systems of
Thought, is listed as edited only by Dieterlen, yet on page 161 a reference to ‘Fortes
1965’ appears which can only be this book; a very important quote is derived from a
1978 article by Mveng which does not appear in the bibliography (ibid. 173).
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significance, especially since as a literature scholar Mudimbe knows full well what
he is doing. What these stylistic and compositional techniques convey is the fact
that he resigns himself to his incapability of resolving the contradictions of his
situation, and that instead he mediates these contradictions in a fairly unprocessed
form to his readers. Below we shall see that this resignation at incomplete consist-
ency marks Tales of Faith as primarily a literary collage, whose constituent
elements happen to look like fragments of state-of-the-art scholarship. In fact
Mudimbe is and expresses the contradictions between and within the constituent
elements of his tale, and he is the homelessness which the heterogeneity of their
genres suggests. At a function organised on the occasion of his delivering the
Jordan lectures in 1993 at the School of Oriental and African Studies, he solemnly
passed around his United Nations passport for the stateless, as if this constituted his
main or only existential and academic credentials.5
The critical or rather ‘book review’ method prevails to such an extent that
Tales of Faith often reads as a barely disguised concatenation of individual
book reviews written for separate publication. Sometimes the transitions from
one pasted-in review to another are very abrupt (e.g. Mudimbe 1997: 47). At
times the author cannot help himself and inadvertently inserts into his text (in
other words, forgot to delete) the typical phrases peculiar to this genre, such as
‘the book under review’ (ibid.: 97), even where in the book’s text not the slightest
indication has been given that at the point reached in the current chapter’s argu-
ment so far, we are proceeding to the discussion of specific texts, and which texts.
The disadvantages of the ‘book review’ method are clear. The original reviews
largely retain their format, contents, and lengths, regardless of the differences
in importance and in specific contribution of each of the books within the
author’s book as a whole. Moreover, each review is to a considerable extent deter-
mined by the specific argument and conceptual apparatus employed by the author
of the book under review, and hence a concatenation of such reviews tends to
display a higher level of disparity and a lower level of sustained discursive
unity than one would expect from an author of Mudimbe’s intercontinental
reputation.
The insistence on the ‘book review method’ suggests how Mudimbe ident-
ifies himself in his authorial practice. The effect of this method is the avoidance
of a systematic conceptual framework, the avoidance of faithful submission to
any established academic discipline except the discipline of literary studies,
whence Mudimbe seems to derive, as the main model of his intellectual pro-
ducts, the virtually unbounded conventions of the ‘essay’, with its generous
allowance (ever since the emergence of the essay as a genre in eighteenth
century Great-Britain) of conceptual freedom, literary originality, and limited
empirical expectations or requirements. Not for nothing is Mudimbe a professor
of French, Comparative Literature and Classics at Stanford University.
5 Personal communication, Richard Fardon, Graham Furniss, and Louis Brenner, London,
1st February, 2001.
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Mudimbe is aware of the literary status of his argument as, more or less,
fiction:
Finally, my presentation of Tales of Faith might be judged too controversial,
aggravated by the weight of theoretical preoccupations. To this I would respond
that what I am offering is not sheer fiction [my italics —WvB]; it can sustain critical
examination and, more importantly, can and should be checked against empirical
studies, above all the experiential authority of serious Africa scholars and ongoing
objectivist researches in the field. Despite its avowed status as a representation inter-
rogating already highly worked and stylized representations, both in spirit and
method it is far removed from metanarratives concerned, say, with the history of
histories of philosophy (e.g. Lucien Braun [Braun 1973 —WvB]), the antihistory
of histories of literature (e.g. Deconstruction and Cie),6 or even – should I dare? –
the possibility of a multivolume on ‘anthropological theories and Africa’, as Sally
Falk Moore menaces in the foreword to her stimulating Anthropology and Africa
(1994)7 (Mudimbe 1997: xi–xii).
On the negative side, this self-definition also means that Mudimbe considers
himself to be at liberty not to identify with any of the conceptual or methodological
canons of any of the academic disciplines which might reasonably be taken to touch
upon his project in this book. We shall come back to the disciplines below. Often
Mudimbe chooses to observe a pristine definitional and conceptual originality
which, to non-Foucaultians like myself, risks appearing pedantic.
In the beginning of Tales, Mudimbe tells us what the book is emphatically not:
‘I do not intend a disciplinary monograph that would actualize faithfully some
prescriptions entertained validly or otherwise by a scholastic coterie.’ (ibid.: ix).
In this intention, with a claim to total originality, he succeeds admirably. He
writes on religion, but rather than adopting any of the current definitions of
religion from late twentieth-century religious studies, religious anthropology,
6 An oblique reference to Derrida’s oeuvre. The eminently Derridean concept of differ-
ence is also one of Mudimbe’s central concepts; the entire book can be said about the
‘liberation of difference’ (Mudimbe 1997: 110) in the context of missionary Roman
Catholicism in Central Africa during the twentieth century. Yet apart from a passing
mention (on pp. 190–1, on the deconstruction of the binary opposition in Derrida’s cri-
tique of logocentrism, significantly so indirectly that not Derrida, but Rotman on Derrida
is quoted by Mudimbe; Rotman 1993: 98), all possible references to Derrida are avoided,
probably merely because both are prominent francophone/America-directed writers, and
Mudimbe wishes to avoid stating the obvious. Yet it remains remarkable that in his
explication (Mudimbe 1997: 21f; based on Dumézil’s reading of ancient Roman myth
and rites; Dumézil 1980: 108) of why the day should begin at midnight and not at
dawn, the notion of ‘an absence which is also a presence’ (as embodied in midnight con-
ceived as the beginning instead of the opposite of the day), the obvious reference to
Derrida is omitted. And when Mudimbe wishes to criticise Western absolute dualism,
it is his own sometime senior colleague at Paris-Nanterre, Lévi-Strauss (cf. Mudimbe
1991a: ix, and for a discussion on Lévi-Strauss and Sartre pp. xiff), despite the
latter’s reliance on binary oppositions, who was to be cited as the authority leading
out of the impasse, rather than Derrida, whose critique of binary oppositions marks
the transition from structuralism to post-structuralism.
7 Moore 1994; repeatedly mentioned in Tales of Faith (Mudimbe 1997: e.g. xii, 27f), but
not listed in that book’s bibliography.
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theology or philosophy of religion, as a classicist he reverts back to a Latin
etymology of the word ‘religion’ borrowed from the authoritative Indo-Europeanist
Benveniste.8
Likewise, Mudimbe uses the word ‘politics’ in the title of his book, but again the
concept of politics is not taken in any of the more established senses canonised by
late twentieth-century academic usage in the social and political sciences, history,
political anthropology etc., but in an original etymological sense of ‘commenting
on the polis’, – again, the classicist, the philologist, is allowed to take precedence
over any of the expectations with which the unprepared reader may approach
Mudimbe’s text: ‘politics in the etymological sense of the word [. . .] That is
[. . .] comments on the polis as city and locus of the analyst’s culture’ (Mudimbe
1997: 15; my italics).
In other words Mudimbe appears to be saying here that the study of other
religions is essentially self-reflection on and by the society to which the researcher
belongs, and hence part of a North Atlantic project of ethnocentrism and hege-
mony. Another definition which Mudimbe gives of the political is scarcely more
encouraging for empirical researchers of politics in Africa:
Any conciliation between a represented and its representation is a matter of perma-
nent negotiations. These presentations are political in nature, insofar as they operate
as metaphors of something else, existing out there in a sociohistorical context
(ibid.: 200).
After this follows the example of Conrad’s sophisticated play on colours in The
Heart of Darkness (1899/1971), which while not devoid of all political impli-
cations, in the eyes of a political scientist or political anthropologist can hardly
count as a convincing evocation of the political domain.
As a result of all these departures from common expectation among Africanists,
Tales of Faith is scarcely about ‘religion and politics in Central Africa’ as many
empirical Africanists would expect it to be. There is hardly any discussion here
of the way in which the political as an institutional sphere linking local and regional
processes of power and performance to the national state and to intercontinental
power relations, takes a religious guise or is informed by religious phenomena,
however defined. Such major popular responses in the religious history of
Central Africa as: Kongo religion, cults of affliction in the field of diagnosis and
healing, Kimbanguism, the emigration of the defeated Lumpa church from
Zambia to Congo, the close alliance between church and state under the Mobutu
regime, the selective caricatural virtualisation of African historic culture in the
context of Mobutu’s politique d’authenticité, the emergence of local independent
churches and mass movements such as Le Combat spirituel (see below) which
specifically address the effects of colonial intellectual and spiritual alienation in
a framework that has departed very widely from missionary Roman Catholicism
and from the existential and signifying predicaments of Roman Catholics priests
8 Benveniste 1973; incidentally, exactly the same passage from the same author features
in Derrida’s recent major piece on religion, in Derrida & Vattimo 1996.
A close reading of Valentin Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith 17
as an intellectual elite – all these and many other themes are surprisingly and
shockingly absent from this book.
Reading this book, it was as if I suddenly found myself in a totally different part
of the African continent from that on which I have concentrated my historical and
anthropological research for the past thirty years. ‘Religion and politics in Central
Africa. . .’ that is Lemarchand, Janzen and Fabian, Jewsiewiecki and Devisch,
de Boeck, Verhaegen, de Craemer, Vansina, de Heusch, Vellut, MacGaffey,
A.F. Roberts, de Lame, but presumably also (if one takes Central Africa slightly
larger than just Congo) Fernandez, Shepperson and Price, Daneel, Ranger,
Taylor, Schoffeleers, van Binsbergen, to mention only a few. . . Some of these
authors do feature in Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith. Yet by and large one gets the
impression of such intellectual isolation and idiosyncrasy, that for instance an
admittedly excellent book published in 1994 by the French historian of Africa
Bernard Salvaing is praised by Mudimbe for doing, as a methodological inno-
vation, precisely the things that were already standard historiographic procedure
for Ranger and his school in the 1970s (Salvaign 1994; Ranger & Kimambo
1972; Ranger & Weller 1975: 42–47). Mudimbe’s approach is too narrowly con-
fined to Congo and to Roman Catholicism. The excursions into parallel processes in
the Islamic domain are too short to be more than perfunctory. Closer attention to
varieties of Protestantism in Congo and Central Africa in general (now mainly
touched on in the puzzling hagiographic section on Jean Ishaku) would have
shown that the liberation of difference in the context of missionary Christianity
in this region from the late nineteenth century onward did not exclusively take
the road of Roman Catholic clerical intellectualism and was not confined to
textual polemics over ideology and dogma but also, and frequently, extended
into open struggles over organisational and financial control (the context for thou-
sands of fissions leading to the proliferation of independent churches typical of
Central and Southern Africa in the twentieth century), to open armed confronta-
tions like in the cases of the Chilembwe uprising and of the Lumpa church, to
secular contestations towards territorial independence, and to a whole range of reli-
gious expressions (prophetism, witchcraft eradication, healing cults, and the broad
syncretistic periphery of African independent Christian churches) in which historic
African religion was highly visible and, far from being denied and suppressed,
engaged with Christian elements of doctrine, ritual and organisation on a far
more equal footing (Shepperson & Price 1958; van Binsbergen 1981; Fields 1985).
The fresh outlook with which Mudimbe approaches the field occasionally makes
him bump his head against an open door. The overt dialogue between missionary
Christianity and African historic religion is as old as David Livingstone’s famous
exchange with the ‘witchdoctor’ during one of his travels up north (Livingstone
1858/1971; Kuper 1979). It is against the background of this ready model that
Michael Kirwen, a century later, ‘converses with a diviner/witchdoctor on such
subjects as the idea of God, the source of evil, divination’, etc. (Mudimbe 1997:
83). Mudimbe misses this intertextual reference to the most famous Protestant
exponent of and writer on ‘the expansion of Christianity to Africa’ (ibid.: ix),
which shows him to be parochially eclectic in his reading when preparing for the
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present book. Mudimbe’s fixation on one particular ideological transmutation
process which happened to be part of his own biography is so strong that he fails
to identify the collective representations proper to other African responses to
Christianity, for instance when Ela lets slip into his text one of the most cherished
clichés circulating in popular African anti-colonial protest:
When Christianity was implanted in Africa, something important happened at the
same time: while the converts were distracted by the Bible thrust into their hands,
their land was stripped from them (Mudimbe 1997: 83, cf. Ela 1989: 147).
This is not just Ela speaking; this is Ela lazily adopting an expression which in the
second half of the twentieth century could be heard all over Africa from the Cape to
Kenya.
A subtitle like ‘religion as political performance’ makes the uninitiated reader
expect a discussion of a wide range of religious contexts in which political perform-
ance may be detected and subjected to exegesis: not just the struggles of Christian
(more specifically Roman Catholic) and post-Christian African intellectuals, but
also those of the millions of non-intellectual adherents of the same Christian
denomination. I shall come back to this point towards the end of my argument.
And if the explicit aim of the book is to present ‘stories of faith and adventure in
intercultural problematics created by the expansion of Christianity in Africa’
(Mudimbe 1997: ix), one can hardly entertain (like Mudimbe seems to do) the
illusion that such an expansion took place in a context where religious alternatives
to Christianity were entirely absent, muted, insignificant, or too insufficiently
documented to deserve explicit discussion. Territorial or ecological cults, royal
cults, professional cults of hunters and blacksmiths, ancestral cults, diagnostic
and therapeutic cults of affliction, prophetism, sorcery beliefs and sorcery eradica-
tion movements, and to top it all the expansion of Swahili-related Islam towards the
continent’s interior – the very texture of nineteenth and early twentieth century
socio-cultural life in Central Africa was saturated with non-Christian religion,
and one cannot simply take for granted (as Mudimbe through his silence on
these issues appears to do) that the prospective clerics who entered the study for
the Roman Catholic priesthood, did so without the slightest exposure to or know-
ledge of these alternatives and were completely indifferent about them.
Let me add that Tales of Faith, one of Mudimbe’s latest books, is extreme in this
respect. Elsewhere he did touch on aspects of historic African religion, e.g. pro-
phetism,9 creation myths, and everyday African life in Parables and fables,10
9 Early eighteenth century Christian Kongo prophets, and twentieth-century Christian
prophets in Southern Africa, are discussed briefly in Tales of Faith (Mudimbe 1997:
71f).
10 Cf. Mudimbe 1991a. Especially in his discussion of the Luba genesis myth Mudimbe
poses as one who, while not an anthropologist, has rubbed shoulders with anthropolo-
gists and moreover lays claim to a relevant lived experience apparently considered by
him as the equivalent of anthropological fieldwork as a source of ethnographic authority:
‘One may ask: Whence comes this authority [to speak on aspects of Luba or Songye
culture in anthropological terms]? (. . .) My answer will be simple. It is true that I am
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whereas sorcery forms the topic of the important book by the Congolese anthropol-
ogist Buakasa entitled L’Impensé du discours (1973), which Mudimbe discusses in
a short chapter of his L’Odeur du père (Mudimbe 1982: 144–155).
It soon transpires that the ‘political’ ‘performances’ Mudimbe has in mind, are
merely instances of selected authors’ textual self-presentation – as if the pro-
duction of written texts is the only performance humans are capable of, and the
most compelling manifestation of religion. A European medieval theologian, a
West African Islamic saintly writer, and the first Roman Catholic priest from
Central Africa are paraded to demonstrate that they
connect the practice of their lives to a belief, and their narratives are in reality per-
formances referring to an external ‘something’: an incredible transcending everyday
practice and its obvious rationality, a Word signifying both revelation and salvation.
Thus, the body of the text by Saint Anselm, Cerno Bokar or Kaoze does not seem
to belong to the text itself but to this something that is both its embodiment and
justification (Mudimbe 1997: 5).
If, at least in Tales of Faith, Mudimbe does not explicitly and unequivocally choose
a constituency in Africa among the African masses and their cultural, political and
religious expressions, neither does he consistently and compellingly choose a
disciplinary constituency in North Atlantic academic life, apart from the lack of
methodological and theoretical constraint which the literary form of the kaleido-
scopic, collage-like essay accords him. He has repeatedly investigated the status
of disciplines in the context of African Studies (Bates–Mudimbe–O’Barr 1993:
160f), and affirms rightly and not very originally that in that context of regional
studies their boundaries have faded away.
Let us consider Mudimbe’s philosophical excursions in a disciplinary light.
Mudimbe is a linguist by training, holder of a Louvain doctorate on the semantics
of the word ‘air’, widespread in West-European languages yet without clear
Indo-European etymology (Mudimbe 1979, Partridge 1979: 10f). Although philo-
sophical references abound in the bibliography to his Ph.D. thesis and all his other
academic books, and although Mudimbe is generally perceived as primarily a
philosopher, Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith is primarily not a philosophical text.
not an anthropologist and do not claim to be one. I spent at least ten years of my life
studying ancient Greek and Latin for an average of twelve hours each week, with
more than that amount of time devoted to French and European cultures, before being
eligible for a doctorate in comparative philology (Greek, Latin, and French) at
Louvain University. I do not know many anthropologists who could publicly demon-
strate a similar experience about their speciality in order to found their authority in
African studies. (. . .) My experience would define itself somewhere between the
practice of philosophy with its possible intercultural applications and the sociocultural
and intersubjective space which made me possible: my Luba-Lulua mother, my
Songye father, the Swahili cultural context of my primary education in Katanga
(Shaba), the Sanga milieu of my secondary education from 1952 to 1959 in Kakanda,
near Jadotville (Likasi), and, later on, at the Catholic seminary of Mwera, near what
was then Elisabethville, and my brief sojourn in a Benedictine monastery in Rwanda’
(Mudimbe 1991a: 124–125).
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True enough, it discusses in some of its chapters the work of specific African
philosophers, and in other passages makes brief reference to such philosophers
as Aristotle, Cicero, de Certeau,11 Foucault, Heidegger, Sartre, Husserl; and to
social scientists working on the borderline with philosophy, such as Bourdieu
and Lévi-Strauss. Mudimbe starts sowing a field whose preparation he does not
bother to explain to the uninitiated reader. Key concepts such as ‘difference’12
and ‘discourse’ are used practically without any formal conceptual discussion;
African theologian’s methods such as ‘retrodiction’ are clearly introduced but as
the thought strategies of others, not of Mudimbe himself. The book is perhaps a
philosophically-inspired essay in the history of ideas, but not a straightforward
contribution to philosophy as such.
There is no denial that in recent decades, African Studies have been greatly
enriched by Mudimbe’s statements on the interdisciplinary nature of African
Studies (Mudimbe 1997: 164), on identity and otherness, and especially on the
Colonial Library, which he defines as:
[. . .] the scientific knowledge gathered, organized and classified by the pre-colonial
and the colonial experiences. It became part of African universities, which were
almost all instituted between 1950 and 1960. The drive, project and organization
of these institutions were European at the heart of all subject matters, foundational
principles and aims (ibid.: 173f).
Thus, the colonial library, in its contents as well as in its significance, generalizes a
conceptual rule, a historical paradigm, and a political project (ibid.: 96).
Tales of Faith’s departure from a disciplinary philosophical framework is already
clear from the fact that Mudimbe can be seen to constantly and eclectically shift
philosophical positions without making these shifts explicit: posing as a Foucaul-
tian yet holding forth today’s North Atlantic science and scholarship as capable of
offering an absolute outside position, a raised pedestal from which to objectively
contemplate non-Western forms of knowledge – hence Mudimbe’s great dis-
appointment when Sandra Harding’s book on the Racial Economics of Science13
brings out the racialist boundary conditions of modern science; describing the
11 Cf. de Certeau 1984; de Certeau 1986; de Vries 1992: 441–477; de Certeau 1988. Tales
of Faith is dedicated to the memory of de Certeau and Mveng, the theologian and histor-
ian of art (cf. Mveng 1965) who will appear below as one of Mudimbe’s heroes of the
saga of clerical intellectualism in Central Africa.
12 Cf. note 6 on Derrida above.
13 Harding 1993; cf. Mudimbe 1997: 187f. In Mudimbe’s discussion of Sandra Harding’s
work, he has to admit that, given the racial dimensions of the production of science in the
contemporary world (the exclusion of certain paradigms and other certain people, and
the privileging of others, on the actor’s subjective grounds of racialism), the pretended
universalism of science is not a reality. But this apparently also comes as a great
disappointment to him, which makes Racial Economy of Science ‘one of the most
distressing books I have ever read’ (Mudimbe 1997: 197). Little wonder: it explodes
the universalist utopia in which he has retreated, as a post-clerical post-African global
intellectual – as a Black person he is reminded that even here he represents ‘the para-
doxical absolute and relative sign of difference’ (ibid.: 191).
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Foucaultian micropolitics of his own missionary education in Bourdieuan terms;
situating ‘difference’ in a Lévi-Straussian rather than a Derridean context, and
hence ignoring the post-structuralist, postmodern critique of identity as a desperate
reconstruction of an essentially discredited concept of the subject, instead as a
Sartrian and Heideggerian celebration of the subject.
Neither is Tales of Faith an obvious contribution to the history or sociology of
ideas, or to African religious studies, predictably following the standards of those
disciplines. Mudimbe appears to be doing intellectual history, but merely on the
basis of a selection of authors’ published books, without wasting time over the
empirically grounded construction of the sociological and historical background,
context, major historiographic debates, and points of method. The discovery of
oral sources for African history, which he erroneously attributes solely to
Vansina,14 is applauded by him as a form of retrodiction (see section 3.1 below);
but the subsequent debate on the limitations and the potential of oral history,
which has raged on until today, appears to have been lost on him – his intellectual
historiography has to do without interviews and without personal recollections
other than the author’s own. In Mudimbe’s hands, intellectual history can certainly
do without archival study, not only of documents produced by the colonial and
postcolonial state and the former motherlands, but also of documents produced
within the formal organisations (the Roman Catholic church and its missionary
and educational institutions; the university and publishing houses) within which
the intellectual struggles took place which Mudimbe’s book seeks to capture and
explain. The essay requires no rigorous empirical backing – nor does it receive
any, in this case, even though Mudimbe asserts that such a backing might have
been given. As he admits, Tales of Faith is ‘a representation interrogating
already highly worked and styled representations’ (Mudimbe 1997: xii), a book
largely based on other books.
Neither is Tales of Faith an obvious contribution to the sociology of knowledge.
It is striking that Mudimbe does not have a sociological frame of interpretation to
speak of. This was already the reproach of Willame in his 1976 review of L’Autre
face du royaume:15 ‘Nulle part, on ne trouve dans l’ouvrage une analyse de cette
formation sociale qu’est le Zaı̈re.’ Significantly, Mudimbe answered not by offer-
ing the sociological analysis that was requested, but by summarising his critique of
colonial science, ‘which deprives young Zaı̈rois of a possible revolution’
(Mudimbe 1982: 199).
14 Vansina 1961. In the same year that Vansina’s highly seminal book was published, the
Rhodes-Livingstone Institute at Lusaka, Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, started
a series of Central Bantu Historical Texts (Apthorpe 1961; Cunnison 1968). When in
1966 Vansina’s Kingdoms of the Savanna was published, which for many years
would remain the bible of precolonial historiography in Central Africa (Vansina
1966), he could base his synthesis on a large amount of oral historical work already con-
ducted in previous decades, mainly by others than himself.
15 Willame 1976. Mudimbe replies at length to Willame’s criticism in L’Odeur du père
(Mudimbe 1982), in a concluding chapter entitled ‘Quel meurtre du père’ [Which
parricide?], (pp. 197–203).
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Mudimbe’s main tools to interpret empirical social situations, their contradic-
tions, and their evolvement over time, are literary and philological analysis, and
psychoanalysis, to which he was introduced in the time that Parisian intellectual
life was under the spell of Jacques Lacan’s famous seminar. Hence Mudimbe
tends to reduce religion to ‘tales’, fables’, etc., and to reduce social conflict and
transformation to an individual scenario of desire, death wish and suppression,
so that collectivities, group processes, and their sociological determinants (status,
reference group behaviour, class, legitimation, power, mobilisation) remain invis-
ible. Also in this respect he shows himself the man of letters, the literature scholar,
propounding a conception of man which, despite all the trappings of a contempor-
ary philosophical idiom to which Foucault, Heidegger and Husserl made major
contributions, largely repeats the individual-centredness of nineteenth-century
CE intellectual and literary thought. It is a scenario of heroes, not of social struc-
tures, their contradictions, and their dynamics.
Thus, when Mudimbe quotes Mveng,
The West agrees with us today that the way to truth passes by numerous paths, other
than Aristotelian, Thomistic logic or Hegelian dialectics. But social and human
sciences themselves must be decolonized (Mudimbe 1997: 172).16
This is interpreted as the expression of a violence whose roots can only be
explained, Mudimbe suggests, by a Freudian theory of anxiety, and not by the poli-
tics and the sociology of mobilisation and contestation. Mudimbe situates Mveng
unique within a scenario where clerical intellectualism is developing an order of
succession to replace the Colonial Library. And implicitly this is an Oedipal situ-
ation, with real or phantasised parricide as the most effective means of succession.
It is the central scenario of the Golden Bough (succession by killing the previous
high-priest; Frazer 1911–1915) reduced to a personal drama.
Provisionally, before even examining what Tales of Faith is about according to
its author (Central African clerical intellectualism), and what my close reading
suggests that it is really about (Mudimbe’s homelessness in the face of death),
the above discussion of his method and his making light with any disciplinary
canon and method allows us to define what I would call the poetics of Mudimbe’s
writing in this book. The book is composed of many heterogeneous small parts,
which collage-fashion are only loosely connected, and many of which in their
internal structure and conception are not manifestly consistent with any disciplin-
ary canon of scholarship. These parts could be considered modules, most of which
appear in the trappings of philosophical or empirical historical argument (others are
autobiographical or hagiographical). What integrates them is not a sustained aca-
demic argument on African philosophy or the history of ideas, but a highly personal
narrative of defining the author’s personal identity and itinerary. The modules are
like the paragraphs in an experimental novel and especially like the lines and
stanzas in a poem. Tales of Faith is primarily a literary product to be judged by lit-
erary standards; its artistic originality consist in the fact that it rather effectively,
16 The Mveng quote is not adequately referenced in the book.
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and deceptively, manages to conceal its literary building bricks as pieces of consist-
ent scholarly argument. This also explains the moving and revelatory effect which
the text of Tales of Faith has on the reader, at an existential level, prodding the
reader to examine her or his own identity and life at the same earnest level of his-
torical self-definition, loss, and hope – as I will do for myself towards the end of my
argument. The book testifies to a great creative and scholarly mind who can afford
to play with the canons of scholarship, first of all because his qualifications in this
field are incontestable, secondly and more importantly because to him these canons
are merely effective stepping-stones (the Wittgensteinian ladder he may cast away
after climbing up), leading towards something even more valuable: the articulation
of identity and personal struggle in the face of death and homelessness – expres-
sing the culturally transmuted person that he is, that many African todays are,
that all human beings are, and thus expressing the human condition in a unique
yet recognizable and identifiable way.
3. What Tales of Faith is really about
3.1. The narrative of clerical intellectualism in Central Africa
Mudimbe situates himself in a multi-generation process of conversion which
begins, two or three generations before his, with adherents to African historic reli-
gious forms dwelling in some Central African village or royal court environment,
and which concludes with him and his fellow clerical or post-clerical intellectuals.
In the latter’s experience African historic religion has become completely eradi-
cated. Instead they have gone through Roman Catholicism or other Christian
denominations, either remaining there or proceeding to agnostic, atheistic, materi-
alist etc. positions. In the process of affirming their difference in the political
context of missionary Christianity, they have ended up in full command of globally
circulating universalising skills and qualifications: fluent in several Indo-European
languages as well as in several African ones; writing poetry, novels, and philo-
sophical and historical treatises; operating libraries, computers, Internet, academic
committees, and publishing resources. Thus they have reached a vantage point from
which, as intellectual producers, they both serve, and critique at the same time, the
power–knowledge structure of North Atlantic hegemony, using Africa as an
exemplary reference point in the process.
Here retrodiction appears as a major technique:
In both moments of negation, as illustrated by Kagame and Mulago, as well as by
most ethnotheological disciples of Placide Tempels, retrodiction seems to be the
main technique that establishes both the new right to speech (and the power of spa-
tializing indigenous localities) and the intellectual efficiency of its interpretation.
Retrodiction – from Latin retro (on the back side, behind, in time back) and
dicere (to speak) – denotes the idea of speaking (and thus synthesizing) from an
illusory, invented moment back in time. In the process, the present invests its
values in the past with its questions and hypotheses, and rediscovers in the invented,
reorganized spaces, laws, paradigms, or the truth of its suppositions. Indeed, the new
creation is often in contradiction with the colonial adapted Enlightenment paradigms
and its library (Mudimbe 1997: 95).
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[. . .] by the 1950s retrodiction was already a paradigm [. . .] Africans can read, inter-
pret and reorganize traces of their own past in order to sum up the spirit of their own
history or constitute the signs and modes of a religious revelation (Mudimbe 1997:
119).
Mudimbe describes the situation of the exemplary African clerical intellectuals of
an earlier generation, such as Mveng (1965), Kagame (1955/1956), Mulago (1965),
and Ki-Zerbo (1972), in terms of cultural métissité, let us say ‘the condition of
being of mixed cultural descent’.
Mudimbe uses strong words indeed to characterise the process that brought
about ‘mixed cultural descent’, and its results. Kagame is, for Mudimbe, a saint;
he relates
how, in the name of Catholicity, the missionaries had imposed a foreign name,
Mungu, as the appellation of God who, in Rwanda, was known for centuries by
the name of Imana. As a priest, he had to accept this sacrilege that, from his knowl-
edge of the Rwandan tradition, he knew was an extreme affront to the divinity and to
his kin. But out of fidelity to his vocation and to Rome, he did submit. God alone
knows [this is a self-proclaimed agnostic scholar writing —WvB] how he suffered
until the day when the Church of his country reinstated the name of Imana,
after rejecting the Mungu of the missionaries. With his death, Africa has lost not
only a learned man but perhaps, and even more, a servant of Imana, and if Imana
has a meaning, Alexis Kagame was, I presume, its luminous sign among us. May
he remain so! (Mudimbe 1997: 144f).
Here, suddenly, there is no longer question of the representation of African historic
culture as inherently problematic:
his extreme kindness [. . .] was a gift of the heart and understanding which, in certain
circumstances, particularly when one attacked the milieu that he thought was the
authentic expression of African culture, could be transformed into dreadfully
violent fits of anger. When this happened, Alexis Kagame would abandon the art
of parenthesis and detour to express his keen indignation, for example, to those
young Westerners working abroad, in lieu of military service, whose brief stay in
Africa succeeds in transfiguring into Africanists and in confirming their intellectual
certainties (Mudimbe 1997: 142f).
Mudimbe’s extensive treatment of Kagame is cast in superlative terms, it is a down-
right hagiography, and Mudimbe’s use of that genre is deliberate. The same genre
reappears in his extensive description, borrowed from Lamar Williamson (1992),
of the Protestant minister Jean Ishaku: killed by Mulelists i.e. Simbas in 1964
because during a raid on their mission station he could not be forced to verbally
betray – like Peter was to betray Jesus thrice before the cock crew17 – his American
fellow-missionary and former teacher.
It is remarkable that in one and the same book Mudimbe should discuss the
spread of Christianity in Africa, and the rise of a science of, for, and by Africa.
The implication is simply that the clerical intellectualism produced both Christian
religious expressions, and African philosophy, and African social science, often by
17 Cf. Bible, Matt. 26: 34: ‘Jesus said unto him, Verily I say unto thee, That this night,
before the cock crow, thou shalt deny me thrice.’
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the same persons. He addresses this question explicitly (Mudimbe 1997: 174f) and
once again his explanation is psychoanalytical and death-related. Perhaps in this
case we are closest to the essentially utopian solution which Mudimbe has
taken for his own predicament, his relation to Africa and to the global domain of
academia:
In the invocation of Africanization policies, by insisting on its dream of self-
sufficiency, I wanted somehow to interrogate indirectly a subjective project and its
almost suicidal terms, by playing silently on a simple Lacanian tension that is rep-
resented in the difference between death-drive and being-towards-death. I mean,
on the one hand, the apparent epistemological eccentricity of the African subject,
such as a Mveng, Kagame, Mulago or Kizerbo who, in their projects, are divided
between their ego and ‘something’ else – the real, symbolic and imaginary spaces
of conflicting fields of sciences opposing their own articulation as historical subjects
in an intellectual configuration. On the other hand, in their consciousness, the per-
sonal experience of a possible fragmentation in an espace métisse, as magnificently
illustrated by Eboussi-Boulaga in Christianity without Fetishes (1981), might indi-
cate signs and dangers for a complete collapse of individuation. Under such an
interrogation, the best resoluteness leads to a rivalry of value systems or, at best,
as witnessed by Mveng and Eboussi-Boulaga, to a desire projected in an unnameable
future. One could thus refer to Lacan’s Ecrits: ‘Who, then, is the other to whom I am
more attached than to myself, since at the heart of my assent to my own identity it is
still he who agitates me’ (Lacan 1977: 172; Mudimbe 1997: 175).
The prophets of the recent African cultural maturity – such as Kagame, Kizerbo,
Mulago or Mveng – stand as mediators between this level and that of confusing
and confused disciplines of African studies, which attend to the adaptation and
indigenization of supposedly universal paradigms of sciences and those of revealed
religions of the letter. The truth that gives them the right to question the pertinence of
such an immense claim is, paradoxically the same that define [sic] them as particular
subject [sic] able to produce value and true or false statements, and to make himself
or herself understood because of his or her submission to a normative and paradig-
matic epistemological order and its intellectual and ethical procedures (Mudimbe
1997: 181f).18
3.2. Homelessness as Mudimbe’s central predicament
3.2.1. Beyond the dream of an African home
Fascinated by the intellectual appropriations and contestations of Africa such as
have constituted the topic of Mudimbe’s writings (1988, 1994), there are significant
topics which scarcely enter into Mudimbe’s discourse, and if they do it is as things
entirely remote from him, external to him, things which appear as chimerical, illu-
sory, irrelevant, and without legitimate appeal: ‘The African people’, the formal
political institutions which inform their lives and which are to some extent
shaped and challenged by these people, the religious forms in which these
people have expressed themselves in precolonial times and which have in part
persisted since the advent of Christianity in the region. It is almost as if in Tales
of Faith the politics of performance are reduced to the essayistic performance of
18 There follows a long quotation from Foucault, predictably 1971: 35f.
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autobiography concealed under the trappings of a chain of objectifying literature
reports, philosophical intermezzi and other detached modules of scholarly pro-
duction, following the autobiographical poetics which I identified above.
In Tales of Faith there is a tension, familiar from every (auto-)biography,
between the subject’s unique itinerary in time and space, and the extent to which
these idiosyncratic details are yet representative for a much larger category of
people, and for an entire period. Sometimes Mudimbe situates his predicament in
the context of a structured collectivity and its shared representations, a culture:
My sense of belonging to a group reflects a degree of my insertion into its culture,
and what my death might signify when I am gone would be my ways of witnessing
to the arbitrariness of my culture (Mudimbe 1997: 199).
This is a surprising passage. For what Mudimbe claims as a culture is not at all one
of the reified ‘African ethnic or tribal cultures’, freeze-dried and packaged within
the Colonial Library. His only sense of belonging resides with what in the forma-
tive period of his life was only in the process of emerging as a minority expression
of cultural contestation: Central African clerical intellectualism. Yet he has a point
precisely because the type of conversion at hand here can be argued to have
become, ultimately, a major cultural expression in African life by the end of the
twentieth century. However, Mudimbe himself does not present such an argument;
sharing with the African masses is not his predilection, in Tales of Faith – although
such a motivation may have inspired his earlier works written in the 1970s.
On the contrary, in Tales of Faith Mudimbe chooses, for the description of his
itinerary, a terminology that is so individual-centred that it primarily conveys a
sense of uniqueness:
Tales of Faith is about the strange constructed place I chose to inhabit so that I could
think about the unthinkable: how well the predicament of Sartre’s pessimism in ‘Hell
is other people’ meets the supreme beauty of ‘I am an Other’. The two positions are
inseparable in this space, in which identities are always mixtures facing each other as
competitive projects aimed as, to use Schlegel’s language, an impossible ars combi-
natoria19 – I mean a universal and definitive ‘logical chemistry’ (Mudimbe 1997:
202).
This is the only real home he may claim as his own. He certainly does not perceive
Africa as such a home, and he perceives his Africanness as problematic:
In the beginning of these lectures, I intended to suggest a phenomenological descrip-
tion of religion as a political performance in theoretical and anthropological spaces,
using Levy-Bruhl’s highly spatialized representations of effects from everyday life,
as well as my own presentations of transcultural enterprises of conversion, adap-
tation and inculturation of Christianity. Now, this reflection is ending as a personal
meditation on the being of a specific métissage between religious forms of experi-
ences. Moreover, I should note that my meditation is grounded not only in my sub-
jectivity but in a special locality of my experience in the world – in a Roman
Catholic culture with its sensibility, which could account for my relative disinterest
in African Islam. If my ‘Africaness’ [sic] designates a legacy and a project, indeed it
19 Cf. Platzeck 1971; a famous author of an Ars combinatoria was Leibniz, published in
Frankfurt am Main 1666.
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also includes the Tales of Faith in all the possibilities of my becoming. Looking a last
time at what Christianity and Islam signify, it is from the solidity of this métissité that
I can marvel about what they still represent as intercultural challenges’ (Mudimbe
1997: 203).
Only once in Tales of Faith have I a spotted a phrase in which Africa, contrary to
Mudimbe’s own and also Kwame Appiah’s injunctions, was simply taken for
granted: characteristically, in that passage, taken for granted not in relation to
Mudimbe’s own positioning, but when it is said of Alexis Kagame that he ‘made
his devotion to Africa into a reality’ (Mudimbe 1997: 135f).
Although as much as anyone else aware of the unique complexities and
potentialities of Africa as a situation,20 Mudimbe is extremely concerned not to
fall into the Afrocentrist trap which Stephen Howe caustically characterised as
the construction of ‘mythical pasts and imagined homes’ (Howe 1999). As a litera-
ture scholar Mudimbe is expertly at home in the realm of textual imagination
(hence titles such as Parables and Fables, and Tales of Faith, for books in
which he analyses crucial aspects of the twentieth-century experience in Central
Africa), but he considers it his task to deconstruct such products of imagination,
not to believe in them.
Afrocentricity or Afrocentrism only features positively in Mudimbe’s work
(Mudimbe 1997: 160) in the attenuated, unemotional, domesticated version of
Richard Sklar, who (true to the politics of knowledge of the culture wars of the
U.S.A. in the late twentieth century)21 obliges by spontaneously identifying as
Jewish-American, not African American.22 In the last decade, hundreds of
Afrocentrist publications have been written by Black scholars, many of whom
would claim that being Black is more or less a condition for credible Afrocentrism.
Identifying such a movement secondarily by quoting a White scholar quoting
someone else on Afrocentrism, indicates that Mudimbe’s interests especially sen-
sitivities lie elsewhere. Likewise, when Mudimbe notes that the philosopher
Masolo
chooses to interrogate the very reason that makes his discourse possible, qualifying his
own reading as ‘a reconstructivist term which symbolizes many aspects of the struggle
of the people of African origin to control their own identity’ (Mudimbe 1997: 29),
20 Cf. Mudimbe (1997: 198): ‘the stories I have chosen to share in these lectures on con-
version are, indeed, not only unthinkable outside of a space circumscribed by African
elements but also well determined by anthropology and the colonial saga, as well as
the practices and missionizing of Islam and Christianity’.
21 Cf. Berlinerblau 1999, which also includes rich bibliographical materials on the recent
American culture wars.
22 Sklar 1993: 98f. Sklar follows the definition of C.S. Whitaker: ‘Properly invoked (. . .)
Afrocentricity[’s] (. . .) importance derives from fundamental issues of comprehension
in the wake of powerful intellectual legacies that tend to discount the capacity of
African cultures and societies to act rationally and constructively in the face of historic
realities. It suggests, importantly, that these realities, not Africans, are the course of pro-
blematic conditions.’ Whitaker 1991: 359.
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all Mudimbe has to say is that Masolo here “plays dangerously on an ‘afrocentri-
city’ perspective” (ibid.).23 Why ‘dangerously’? There follows Mudimbe’s diatribe
against Afrocentrism which he calls an attempt to
essentialize African cultures, reducing the complexity of histories to some metaphors
and their variations. In this transposition that is an Ubertragung [sic; read Übertra-
gung —WvB] in a Freudian operation, the real self is lost in a magnificent negation.
The contradictory, negotiated, and perpetually recommenced enunciation about
oneself – and whose truth is always and already in the apprehension of oneself as
a being-for-other – ceases to indicate the intricacy of an existence (of any existence),
of a culture (of any culture) as project (Mudimbe 1997: 30).
In a book which discusses the cultural and religious dimension of the colonial con-
quest, the devastating effects of Christianity upon African culture and spirituality,
the Colonial Library as an objectifying ordered caricature of African socio-cultural
realities, etc., Mudimbe finds mildness and patience for most of what came to
Africa from the North Atlantic, but he is very dismissive of the Afrocentrists
who, after all, seek to explode the heroic epic of cultural transmutation which
Mudimbe sings in this book: the sage of clerical intellectualism. Afrocentrism is
reduced by Mudimbe to a mere act of banal Freudian transference, i.e. distorted
self-projection out of touch with reality. Elsewhere in the book the young
African critics of Kagame (Mudimbe 1997: 143), or of the European missionising
of Africa,24 are dismissed by Mudimbe in similarly distancing terms. Here he finds
himself in the company of Kwame Appiah, another cosmopolitan African philoso-
pher who has endeared himself to a North Atlantic audience by rejecting the essen-
tialism of Africanness and by mediating, instead, a sensible, middle-of-the-road
image of Africa that no longer posits a radical defiance of universalising North
Atlantic categories and procedures of thought.25
In the same vein, Mudimbe strongly objects both to the substance and to the
tone of voice of Diagne’s attempt to find a local African grounding for African
philosophy:
Sarcastic, Diagne rejects both the neocentrist Euro-philosophy, as represented by
Franz Crahay [1965], and the critical Marxist Euro-philosophy symbolized by
Paulin Hountondji [1976] and other African disciples of Althusser. They are
wrong, states Diagne, in the same way Tempels and his disciples were wrong,
because they ‘deportent la problematique du fait africain ou négro-africain aussi
loin sinon encore plus loin de ses axes que l’ethnophilosophie elle-même’ (1981:
83). [. . . ‘they are wrong for transferring the problematic of the African or the
Negro-African factum as far away, and even further than the practitioners of ethno-
philosophy.’] They are also wrong, adds Diagne, because in their linking of the
23 The lower-case initial of ‘afrocentricity’ here is original.
24 ‘For people familiar with African Christianity, the conversion model [i.e. the approach
to Central African Christian intellectual history as propounded in Tales of Faith —WvB]
in both its intention and realization would describe the African critique as generally
violent and often, alas, excessive, not only in its evaluation of conversion policies but
also of the missionary’ (Mudimbe 1997: 56).
25 Appiah 1992; cf. Mudimbe 1997: 63f for a most sympathetic reading; and on Afro-
centrism: Appiah 1993: 24–25.
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genesis of African philosophy to alphabetic revolution in Africa, they are presenting
a political thesis: African philosophy is conceived as the consequence of coloniza-
tion that brought about alphabetic writing and thus let us celebrate colonialism,
thanks to which African philosophizing has become possible.
One does not understand why Diagne uses disguised or direct insults in order to make
his points. On the other hand, it seems to me that his apparently well-evidenced gen-
eralizations are not philosophically obvious. The concepts of Africa, Negro-African,
for example, are not transparent, particularly when the author claims to extend them
as far back as the pharaonic periods. In the same vein, to postulate – from the phar-
aonic Egypt to Edward Blyden, Ogotemmeli, Anta Diop, Chinua Achebe, Senghor,
etc. – the continuous epistemological history of a Negro-African cultural context is
surely a nice hypothesis, but it is untested and probably untestable.
Diagne is more serious in his propositions for an African philosophical praxis. With a
few neat strokes, he indicates the theoretical conditions for philosophizing: a dëgg
(argumentation) in which a texxale (critical reflection) should be promoted dis-
tinguishing valid and non-valid propositions (woor ag sanxal) in order to construct
a xelaat (epistemology).
So far there has been nothing quite like this in the confrontation between
philosophy and African Weltanschauungen. The very fact that in his innovative
‘book two’ – strangely entitled Epistemology and Neo-pharaonic Problematics
(1981: 129–219) – Diagne’s constant use of Wolof categories is a tour de force,
may make the translation of texts by Plato, Althusser, Tempels, Crahay, Kagame,
Mulago, Diop, Césaire, Senghor, Ndaw, Towa and Hountondji seem a simple curi-
osity. This takes on a radical meaning when, in his conclusion (1981: 213–19),
Diagne puts aside French as mediation and synthesizes his philosophical theses
directly in Wolof (Mudimbe 1997: 104f; Diagne 1981).
How can a person like Mudimbe not understand the anger informing Diagne’s style
of writing? Yet, to show his good will Mudimbe later on (ibid.: 110) adopts Diagne’s
Wolof philosophical concepts and weaves them into his own cosmopolitan
philosophical discourse. But it is Hountondji, despite the geographical and denomi-
national divides that separate him from Mudimbe (Benin versus Congo, Roman
Catholicism versus Presbyterianism) who is considered worthy of Mudimbe’s
praise and who even receives the exceptional honour of being recognised by him
as a fellow-métis – a concept to which I shall return at length (ibid.: 107f).
Mudimbe even concedes (with the placating tones used towards a rebellious
child?) that Diagne’s Diop-derived Egyptocentrism is ‘surely a nice hypothesis’,
but this again is clearly not Mudimbe’s cup of tea. He has no time for Egyptocentr-
ism, and has kept considerable distance from the Black Athena debate, to which he
would have been eminently qualified to make significant contributions given his
unique combination of being an African classicist working in the United States
who, moreover, is the most applauded critic of North Atlantic and African con-
structions of Africa. Apart from a passing reference to Bernal’s contribution on
Black Athena in Harding’s Racial Economics of Science (Bernal 1993; cf.
Mudimbe 1997: 187f), Mudimbe devoted one short article to the Black Athena
debate, subsequently incorporated without major changes in The Idea of Africa
(Mudimbe 1992b: 114–123; 1994: 93–104). Here he notes the following minor
disagreements with Bernal as a classicist and a historian of ideas. Bernal is
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reproached by Mudimbe for overlooking Herodotus’ statement that the Pelasgoi
were a ‘non-Greek speaking populace’ (1992b: 116); to overlook Plutarch’s accu-
sation against Herodotus (De Herodoti malignitate) that he magnified the barbar-
ians (ibid.: 118, cf Plutarch [1989]); that Herodotus naively reports on fabulous
monsters therefore cannot be credible on other issues;26 that Herodotus deliberately
constructed his account in Historiae so as to humour his audience’s nationalism and
anti-barbarian feelings (ibid.: 118); that also in Herodotus a specific philosophy of
history informs the actual narratives, manipulating the facts so as to render their
narrative less then totally credible (ibid.: 119); most importantly, he rightly criti-
cises Bernal’s unique focus on eighteenth-century Germany for the emergence of
race thinking whereas the true place where that ideology arose was France (ibid.:
121). Mudimbe is thus far from hostile, and even very helpful. He points out that
unidentified “Black ‘Afrocentrist’ scholars” (ibid.: 122) have reproached Bernal
for playing down the contribution by Cheik27 Anta Diop; Mudimbe suggests that
this may have been because Bernal is concerned with diffusion from Egypt
towards the north, east and west, whereas Diop was mainly concerned with inter-
actions between the south and the north (ibid.: 122f). He adduces other potential
allies of the Black Athena thesis which Bernal has overlooked: Frazer, Wallis
Budge, Seligman, Frankfort, and more recently and most importantly from the
Africanist point of view: Mveng (1972) and Bourgeois (1973). By and large
Mudimbe has sympathy for Bernal’s Black Athena project, but
[. . .] although I understand the political significance of his project and its usefulness,
I am worried by the fact that it might, and very probably will, be manipulated by both
the most sophisticated and the least critical of his constituencies for reasons that have
nothing to do with science and the search of truth (Mudimbe 1992b: 123).28
Beware of enthusiasm and of demagogic rhetorics, is what Mudimbe seems to be
saying here! Not the debunking of North Atlantic hegemonic views of global cul-
tural history, nor the elevation of a parochial, partisan Africa to a position where it
can be the cradle of ‘Black’ [i.e. Egyptian] Athena, is what really interests him, but
detached more or less universal categories such as science and truth.29
We would do injustice to Mudimbe if we did not realise that his reservations vis-
à-vis Afrocentrism and the Black Athena debate, and his ignoring African historic
religion, is not simply an idiosyncratic expression of his cultural and geographical
homelessness and nothing more. At the back is a profound methodological
26 Mudimbe 1992b: 118 (in defence of Herodotus, meanwhile cf. Pritchett 1993;
Spiegelberg 1927; however, cf. also Moles 1993).
27 NB: in Mudimbe 1997 (e.g. 30, 102, 119, 171, and index), the name is repeatedly spelled
as Sheik, as if name were a religious title, not a given name, as it is usually considered to
be. Cf. Amadiume 1997: 468–469; van Sertima 1986; Gray 1989; Fauvelle 1996.
28 No doubt, my forthcoming book Global bee flight will represent Mudimbe’s worst fears
come true on this point.
29 Meanwhile the fact that science is less than universal and e.g. is capable of endorsing
racial prejudice and enforcing inequalities along racialist lines, is recognized by
Mudimbe in his discussion of Sandra Harding (mentioned elsewhere in my argument);
cf. Mudimbe 1997: 184ff.
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dilemma, which attends the entire empirical study of African religion through par-
ticipant observation or through African believers’ introspection, and which comes
out clearly in Mudimbe’s discussion of Mulago’s project:
Theoretically, Mulago’s project, as in Un Visage africain du Christianisme (1965),
La Religion traditionnelle des Bantu et leur vision du monde (1973), or Simbo-
lismo religioso africano (1979), can be summed up as follows: in the name of
the truths of a locality or place, it questions the pertinence of colonial ‘scientific’
and ‘religious’ dominant discourses; insists on their shortcomings by reminding
their practitioners that there is always a radical deviation between a lived experi-
ence (e.g. succession of seasons) or an experienced fact (e.g. death), and its poss-
ible multiple levels of interpretation presented as history, epic or simply narrative.
Yet the project itself has recourse to the same controversial logical empiricism it
wants to relativize. In fact, the invocation of the truths of the place against those
of the interpretive space implies that there is somehow (almost necessarily) better
reflections of the locality in the insider’s discourse; and this hypothesis then
becomes an ideological framework and a means for negotiating a right to the
authentic speech in the field of discourses about the native place (Mudimbe
1997: 89).
If the insider’s discourse cannot be trusted to produce a better truth, and if the
ethnotheological30 discourse is in itself external to Africa, then African historic
religion may be essentially unknowable and irrelevant.
But by posing the question, and by contesting the validity of the local perspec-
tive by reproaching it for its claim of superiority, Mudimbe in fact claims for
himself and his North Atlantic academic universalist science a similarly privileged,
superior outside position – which apart from being hegemonic would be very un-
Foucaultian. African historic culture and religion have a right to affirm themselves
for their own sake – which is why eleven years ago, as an accomplished North
Atlantic anthropologist of religion, I opted to become a diviner-priest-therapist
in the Southern African sangoma tradition. Moreover, there is another reason,
one to be found within universalising science, why Mudimbe should be far less
dismissive of Afrocentrism. Let me elaborate.31
3.2.2. In vindication of Afrocentrism
One cannot help agreeing with Howe’s (1999) and Lefkowitz’s (1996) identifi-
cation of the deficiencies endemic to the Afrocentric genre, which must play a
role in Mudimbe’s rejection: the poor scholarship; the amateurish, autodidactic
approach to grand historical and comparative themes without systematic use of
obvious sources and obvious methods; the Afrocentrist authors’ manifest and
30 Mudimbe defines ethnotheology ‘as a subfield uncomfortably situated between theology
and anthropology, opposed to reductionism and claiming to speak in the name of the
vitality of local cultures’, pointing out that it faces a major paradox: as anthropology
ethnotheology affirms local cultures, as theology it denies them for the sake of the
hegemony of the imported Christian doctrine (Mudimbe 1997: 88f).
31 Van Binsbergen, 2000a: 175–180 – the next passages of the present argument are an
English rendering of part of my French article, of my Global Bee Flight (forthcoming),
and of van Binsbergen 1997.
32 Wim van Binsbergen
deliberate isolation from current debates and current advances in the fields of
scholarship they touch on; and the occasional lapses into Black racism.
However, where I fundamentally disagree with these critics of Afrocentrism is
with regard to the extent of dismissal that Afrocentrism calls for. For Mudimbe,
Afrocentrism is sheer transference of an inferiority complex among today’s
African Americans. For Lefkowitz, it is the celebration of racialist myth disguised
as engaged history. For Howe, Afrocentrism is largely what in our Marxist days we
used to call false consciousness: a view of reality which is systematically distorted
and which can be explained from the historical trajectory traversed, in recent cen-
turies, by the collectivity holding these views. Where Howe finds Afrocentrism by
and large intolerable it is because, in the context of the politics of identity on which
the postmodern world revolves, it is no longer politically correct, yea it is more and
more even politically impossible, to publicly ignore or dismiss the Afrocentrist
claims; hence their increasing influence in the U.S.A. educational system. For
Howe (1999: 6), as for me, the central issue here is explicitly the truth value of
Afrocentrism. For Howe the truth value of Afrocentrism is zero, in other words
Afrocentrism is entirely mythical. For me, very much to the contrary, Afrocentrism
(despite its endemic defects) does contain a kernel of truth, in the form of testable
hypotheses about the possible contributions which Africans may have made
towards the world-wide development of human culture (van Binsbergen 1997;
2000b; forthcoming). Such a position has important political and critical impli-
cations. For if there is even the remotest possibility that some of the Afrocentrist
tenets (however unscholarly in their present elaboration and substantiation)
might yet be confirmed when restated in a scholarly manner and investigated
with state-of-the-art scientific methods, then the wholesale dismissal of Afrocentr-
ism cannot simply be the positive, enlightened gesture Howe, Lefkowitz and even
Mudimbe claim it to be. Such dismissal risks being a confirmation of the status quo,
a continuation of the processes of exclusion to which Black people, inside and
outside Africa, have been subjected for centuries – an issue which in principle
appeals to Mudimbe. Here there is a political role to be played by the odd
person out: the scholar and polemicist who for lack of Black or African antecedents
cannot be suspected of being on a mere consciousness-raising trip, and who yet, for
respectable scholarly reasons, defends views similar to or identical with those of the
Afrocentrists. Martin Bernal’s has been such a case, inevitably denounced by Howe
and Lefkowitz, but treated with far more sympathy by Mudimbe.
Historiographic usage offers a number of ready answers to the fundamental
question: By what method and with what validity and reliability do we construct
images of the past? For Howe, and for many historians like him who situate them-
selves in the empiricist tradition while being suspicious of an over-reliance on sys-
tematic theory, a central methodological approach is that of ‘common sense’, an
appeal to the self-validating effect of simple everyday logic and common (i.e.
North Atlantic, Western) everyday concepts. Inevitably (since everyday common
perspectives are by definition intersubjective, shared with others and recognised
to be so shared) a common sense appeal would favour the paradigms as taken
for granted in a given discipline at a given moment of time.
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It has been Bernal’s merit (1987; 1991)32 to make us aware of the immense
historical and political significance of one such historiographic paradigm, whose
demolition has been the purpose of his Black Athena project:
(a) Greek classical culture was essentially independent from any inputs from
the Ancient Near East (Anatolia, Phoenicia, Egypt, Palestine, Syria,
Mesopotamia).
As far as Afrocentrism is concerned, three other such historical paradigms have
been dominant throughout the second half of the twentieth century:
(b) Ancient Egypt, although situated on the edge of the African continent, was
essentially a non-African civilisation whose major achievements in the fields
of religion, social, political and military organisation, architecture and other
crafts, the sciences etc., were largely original and whose historical cultural
indebtedness lay, if anything, with West Asia rather than with sub-Saharan
Africa.
(c) Ancient Egypt did not have a profound, lasting, and therefore traceable impact
on the African continent, particularly not on sub-Saharan Africa.
(d) Contemporary Africa is a patchwork quilt of numerous distinct local cultures,
each supported by a distinct language and each giving rise to a distinct ethnic
identity, in the light of which broad perspectives on continental cultural con-
tinuity going back to the remoter past much be relegated to the realm of ideo-
logy and illusion.
Phrased in this way, these paradigms, although largely taken for granted by the
scholars working in their context, are in principle testable hypotheses. Although
they are not intrinsically ideological, unmistakably they are well attuned to a hege-
monic North Atlantic perspective on the world. They postulate a world which is
neatly compartmentalised; incomparably more so than would be suggested not
only by the globalising experience of our own time, but also by the demonstrable
spread of agricultural techniques, weaponry, musical instruments, languages, belief
systems including world religions, formal systems such as board games, divination
methods, myths and symbolism, across the African continent and in considerable
(though painfully understudied) continuity with the rest of the Old World, and
even the New World. Under such compartmentalisation, a whole mythical geo-
politics comes into being: the mystery and mystique of Europe – more recently:
of the North Atlantic in general – can be maintained as a solid ideological
power base for colonialism and postcolonial hegemony; Egypt, Africa, African
cultures, remain the ultimate other, to the North Atlantic, but also to one
another; a conceptual and geopolitical ‘divide and rule’ keeps them in their sub-
ordinate place vis-à-vis the North Atlantic; and the basic flow of achievement is
defined as going from north to south, while the hegemonically undesirable idea
of counter-flows in a northerly direction is ruled out. These may be testable hypo-
thesis, but they are very close to geopolitical myths.
32 Cf also his contributions in van Binsbergen 1997.
34 Wim van Binsbergen
If our four paradigms (a) through (d) can be demonstrated to have considerable
hegemonic ideological potential (not to say that they are downright Eurocentric and
racist), their inverses are likely to have a similar but opposite ideological charge.
These inverses would stress historical cultural continuity:
(a-inverse) between Greece and the ancient Near East including Ancient Egypt;
(b-inverse) between prehistoric cultures situated on the Africa continent south of
the Tropic of Cancer (238270 North), and Ancient Egypt;
(c-inverse) between Ancient Egypt and latter-day African cultures;
(d-inverse) between latter-day African cultures even regardless of the influence of
Ancient Egypt.
It is my contention that the paradigms (a-inverse) through (d-inverse) contain a
healthy and serious critique of hegemonic misconceptions, and therefore in
themselves should at least be granted some plausibility. It now so happens that
these inverse paradigms are among the central tenets of Afrocentrism, tenets
which therefore can no longer be relegated to mere false consciousness and
Black consciousness-raising, but deserve to be admitted to the central halls of
scholarship. To dismiss these inverse views as ‘myths’ (Howe, Lefkowitz) or
‘transference’ (Mudimbe) is not only doing them injustice, but also means
myopia: the potentially mythical nature of the dominant paradigms itself is
insufficiently brought to the fore.
In Lefkowitz’s case this myopia is manifest, and it was convincingly exposed in
Bernal’s review of her book Not out of Africa (Bernal 1996; 1997). In Mudimbe, a
similar myopia risks going unnnoticed, because of his acclaimed status as an
African intellectual of great cosmopolitan scholarly accomplishment. Neither is
the myopia of Howe’s book readily recognised since the execution of its design
is largely impeccable. Not being an Africanist himself, he can only be praised
for the meticulous way in which he has digested the vast relevant bibliography,
offering a middle-of-the-road synthesis in line with the dominant paradigms (a)
through (d). He finds little, in the enormous literature he has plodded through, to
falsify the dominant common-sense paradigms (a) through (d); but did he search
closely enough? To Howe, ‘the actual evidence of ideas about kingship paralleling
Egypt’s either in Sub-Saharan Africa or in the Aegean is extremely thin’ (1999:
130). On the basis of what kind of authority is such a statement made? My own
recent discovery of very extensive Egyptian parallels in the material on Zambian
kingship (van Binsbergen, forthcoming) came only after studying Nkoya kingship
and myths for twenty years, from the inside, and after far more extensive exposure
to Ancient Near Eastern studies than anthropologists and Africanists normally
get;33 this suggests some of the methodological and paradigmatic problems
involved: usually the more one specialises in one spatio-temporally specific
domain of human culture, the less likely one is to gain similarly detailed and up-
to-date information on other domains, and the more likely one is to retreat into
33 I was a full-time member of the Workgroup on Religion and Magic in the Ancient Near
East, Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, Wassenaar, The Netherlands, 1994–95.
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myopic paradigmatic self-evidences. Contrary to what Howe claims, the evidence
on parallels between Ancient Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa is massive, though
uneven (Shinnie 1971: 447f).
In the light of my discussion of Mudimbe’s position above and below in the
present argument, these four hypotheses and their radical, Afrocentrist inverses
enable us to articulate Mudimbe’s contradictory positioning within the globalising
politics of knowledge on Africa. As is clear from his discussion of Bernal, he is
inclined to accept the first inverse hypothesis, but considers it dangerous and scho-
larly vulnerable. He does not pronounce himself on the second inverse hypo-
thesis.34 He considers the third inverse hypothesis ‘nice’, but untested and
probably untestable. And he rejects the fourth inverse hypothesis. By and large
he shows himself to be rather on the side of established, potentially hegemonic
‘common sense’ models of African history in line with dominant universalising
science, and considerably less sensitive to the present-day politics of knowledge
on Africa than one would expect considering the fact that he is the most famous
critique of North Atlantic constructions of Africa.
Scholarly reputations are readily sacrificed on the altar of Howe’s indignation
vis-à-vis Afrocentrism, and the more readily, the less Howe knows of their special-
ist field: Clyde Ahmad Winters, Herodotus, Henry Frankfort, Frobenius, Sergi.
These ancient and modern scholars have one thing in common which makes
them unwelcome in the common-sense, main-stream paradigmatic world to
whose authority Howe appeals. They all had the ability to think across established
cultural and geopolitical boundaries, whether this meant explaining the origin of
the Persian wars in a complex context encompassing the entire Ancient World
(Herodotus), or lumping Egypt and Mesopotamia in one grand argument
(Frankfort’s Kingship and the Gods), or stressing the essential continuity
between West Africa, North Africa, Europe, and Asia, when it comes to kinship
somatic traits, kinship patterns, languages, and symbolism. Not surprisingly,
Howe’s villains appear as intellectual heroes in one of my own books in progress.
I am pleased to add that, as a sign of Mudimbe’s ambivalent positioning in this pro-
blematic, at least two of Howe’s villains appear as potential allies, if not heroes,
also with him (Frobenius and Frankfort).
4. The prominence of death in Mudimbe’s work
Because of Mudimbe’s relentless insistence on originality, there is an essential
unpredictability about Mudimbe’s work, which markes it incomparably more
difficult to read and to grasp than the average Africanist academic text production
along disciplinary lines (African anthropology, history, religious studies, philo-
sophy, theology etc.), and renders this oeuvre one of the most impressive,
moving and original bodies of texts to have risen from the modern (post-eighteenth
century CE) encounter between Africa and the North Atlantic. Like all true poets,
34 At least not in Mudimbe 1997, and in the selection of his other publications on which my
present argument is based.
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Mudimbe’s writing is essentially a writing in the face of death. It took a while
before this insight dawned upon me. I was at first puzzled by the uncanny promi-
nence of references to parricide (often solemnly and in Freudian fashion called ‘the
murder of the father’) in his approaches to African literature, ethnotheology and
philosophy (Mudimbe 1991b: 71ff; 1992a). Thus when Paul-Michel Foucault in
early adult life drops the ‘Paul’ which was the given name of his father and
grandfather, and lives on with only the ‘Michel’ which his mother gave him,
Mudimbe interprets this in the line of Lacan and Freud as parricide, even though
by the same time Mudimbe claims to have proceeded to a Jungian perspective
(Mudimbe 1991: xi) which would lay less stress on the sexual scheme but
instead would favour an interpretation in terms of a heroic mother-son myth
(Jung 1987). Likewise it is Kasavubu’s rejection of Lumumba’s parricidal chal-
lenge to the former colonising power at the moment of Congo’s Independence,
which, in Mudimbe’s off-hand analysis, led to Lumumba’s isolation and murder
(Mudimbe 1997: 131). Parricidal is the revolt of younger African philosophers
against their African predecessors,35 while Kagame himself seems to have
incited yet another form of parricide:
Within a few weeks, I saw him convert entire annual classes of students to a ‘natio-
nalistic’ view of African history and philology. I told him that I feared that such a
perspective, by generously glossing over the epistemological preconditions of the
murder of the Father, ran the risk of further perverting the discipline of the social
sciences in Africa, already so encumbered by a priori ideological assumptions of
‘colonial science’. His response was surprising to me in its simplicity: ‘obsession
is also a path to the truth’ (Mudimbe 1997: 140).
From his own itinerary, this forms of parricide appears to be what Mudimbe fears
most. For when in the middle of the twentieth century Central African Roman
Catholic clerical intellectuals can be seen to struggle with how much of global
Christianity and North Atlantic philosophy and science they can retain while assert-
ing their rightful difference vis-à-vis that imported foreign body of ideas and vis-à-
vis the hegemonic power of the Europeans who persuaded or forced them to accept
that body and built it into their very lives, that retention is suggested as a refusal on
their part to proceed to parricide. In the concluding chapter of L’Odeur du père
(1982), Mudimbe defends himself against Willame’s (1976) critique of L’Autre
face du royaume: the suggestion of an incitement of revolutionary parricide with
which that earlier book had ended, has been misunderstood by Willame and has
only a very precise, coded, psychoanalytical symbolic meaning which however
escapes me:
À présent, j’aimerais savoir ce que l’on entend exactement quand on me parle de
‘meurtre du père’. J’ai accepté cette expression imagée (Recherche, Pedagogie et
Culture, no 20) pour dire une infirmité et non pour la vivre en une utopie faite d’har-
monie. Je n’ai point plaidé pour une immobilité heureuse qu’accomplirait simple-
ment un cri, mais invoque cette manière de mouvement tres violent dont parle
Freud en conclusion de son analyse de l’Homme aux loups. Et bien entendu,
35 Cf. Mudimbe 1997: 104 (for Diagne) and 143 (for Kagame).
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qu’on le sache, ce dernier appel n’a rien à voir avec l’aphanisis. Vraiment ?
(Mudimbe 1982: 203, responding to Willame 1976).
The point escapes me, partly because I cannot clearly identify whose desire is dis-
appearing here and why. But there is an echo here of passsages in Tales of Faith
(Mudimbe 1997: 112f, 175) where Mudimbe repeatedly speaks of the new desire
among young converts that emerged as a result of missionising, and whose trans-
formed and transgressive fulfilment was the project of clerical intellectualism;
partly because Freud’s Wolf-man (Gardiner 1972; cf Freud 1953–1974) ends
with an evocation not of parricide, but of a strikingly different form of violence:
the fantasised homosexual rape of the son by the father.
The fact that, in the face of overwhelming evidence concerning the eradication
of African historic religion, Mudimbe refuses to make a definitive statement against
Christianity and its negative effects on Africa, means that (as Tales of Faith makes
very clear) even though he has become an agnostic, he cannot bring himself to
commit parricide vis-à-vis the Roman Catholic Church.
It is not clear what all these insistences on symbolic or vicarious parricide mean
in relation to Mudimbe’s biological father, about whom I could only pick up from
his texts that he was of Songye extraction, while his mother was Luba-Lulua. Death
appears not only as the murder of the father contemplated as possible but, after all,
undesirable, or as the others’ parricide to be condemned, but particularly as
Mudimbe’s own death:
Is there any individual, reflecting on his or her finitude, who does not experience the
sense of being or, at any rate, of belonging to an endangered species? Death, as a
closure of existence in the world, sanctions the absurdity or – if one prefers – the
mystery of life and forces the observer to evaluate existence from the background
of a culture and its a prioris. My sense of belonging to a group reflects a degree of
my insertion into its culture, and what my death might signify when I am gone
would be my ways of witnessing to the arbitrariness of my culture. The plurality
of cultural a prioris is an empirical fact (Mudimbe 1997: 199).
4.1. An excursion into the plurality of African cultures
In the preceding quotation, what could Mudimbe’s expressions ‘my sense of
belonging to a group’ and ‘my culture’ possibly mean coming from a person
whose life’s itinerary has been the celebration of homelessness? And why should
he join in the now obsolescent reification of culture? – We are facing the
paradox that Mudimbe in his method of philosophy and intellectual history, and
in the face of many African intellectuals’ affirmations of the local, retreats to the
implied, if qualified (Mudimbe 1997: 187f), universalism of the current North
Atlantic dominant academic discourse, yet affirms the sui generis plurality of
African cultures as an empirically demonstrated fact and as one of the achieve-
ments of the paradigmatic shift occurring in anthropology with the transition
from pre-classic (diffusionism, evolutionism, organicism) to classic (structural-
functionalist) versions of that discipline in the middle of the twentieth century:
Concrete examples of methodological procedures that managed to recognize the
proper historic and cultural specificities of each human group were studies in
38 Wim van Binsbergen
anthropology of African religions published or signed by M. Fortes (1959, 1965),
John Middleton (1960), Marcel Griaule (1948) and Luc de Heusch [sic] (1958,
1971, 1972). They taught us that an account of, and attention to, each group’s cultural
arbitrariness and specific history enabled us to understand that the less visible aspect
of cultural transformations might perhaps be the most important from a historical
perspective (Mudimbe 1997: 161).36
There is room for amazement here. Few African scholars today, and a diminishing
number of non-African Africanists, could be tempted to sing the praises of these
works which, although great achievements in their time, are now unmistakably
dated. These books rely on structural-functionalist and structuralist models
which have since been severely criticised, precisely because – exactly opposite
to what Mudimbe suggests – they are inherently a-historical. They depict these
distinct ‘cultures’ as timeless givens waiting to be intellectually appropriated in
the present through the presentist anthropological technique participant obser-
vation – with the sole exception of de Heusch’s work, whose attempt to reconstruct
the conjectural ‘archaeology of Bantu thought’ has since been dismissed by the
Nestor of African history, Vansina, for being merely elegant (i.e. system-driven,
structuralist) instead of genuinely historical (Vansina 1983; cf. van Binsbergen
1992a: 239ff). Moreover these famous anthropological works reflect the ‘divide
and rule’ fragmentation of the African socio-cultural-political space which is a
direct product of colonial conquest and colonial administration. They reinforce
the image of Africa as a patchwork quilt of bounded, self-contained, mutually unre-
lated and internally highly integrated and structured distinct ‘cultures’, each to be
neatly identified by its ethnic name. In other words, they perpetuate the Colonial
Library and its epistemological and methodological shortcomings, which
Mudimbe himself has greatly helped us to spot but, with his usual mildness of jud-
gement, adamantly refusing to throw away the child with the bath-water: however
defective and distorting, the Colonial Library is for him also the basis of valid
African scholarship by Africans (Mudimbe 1997: 180).
The distinctiveness of African cultures is almost a dogma of cosmopolitan
African philosophy, which thus denies what Afrocentrist scholars, and their Euro-
pean allies and predecessors have insisted on: the considerable historical cultural
unity of Africa, certainly on a regional level comprising entire sets of previously
distinguished ‘ethnic cultures’, and in certain respects perhaps even on a continen-
tal scale (van Binsbergen 1999; also Global Bee Flight (forthcoming); 1997a).
Mudimbe is not alone in his affirmation of African cultural fragmentation. It is
remarkable that outside Afrocentrist circles, the argument of convergence has
met with so little acceptance among African philosophers today. Instead they vir-
tually unanimously support the argument of cultural diversity. In Appiah’s words:
If we could have traveled through Africa’s many cultures in (. . .) [precolonial times]
from the small groups of Bushman hunter-gatherers, with their stone-age materials,
to the Hausa kingdoms, rich in worked metal – we should have felt in every place
36 A list of the titles referred to: Fortes 1959; Fortes & Dieterlen 1965; Middleton 1960;
Griaule 1966; de Heusch 1958, 1971, 1972.
A close reading of Valentin Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith 39
profoundly different impulses, ideas, and forms of life. To speak of an African
identity in the nineteenth century – if an identity is a coalescence of mutually
responsive (if sometimes conflicting) modes of conduct, habits of thought, and pat-
terns of evaluation; in short, a coherent kind of human social psychology – would
have been ‘to give to nothing a local habitation and a name.’ (Appiah 1992: 174,
cited in approval by Bell 1997: 218f n.29).
In line with this stress on precolonial fragmentation lies the African philosopher’s
Kaphagawani’s thesis on ‘C4’, which is a scientistic formula meant to express ‘the
Contemporary Confluence of Cultures on the Continent of Africa. This is a postco-
lonial phenomenon where different cultures meet and mingle to form new, hybrid
forms’ (Kaphagawani & Malherbe 1998: 209). In this formulation the emphasis on
a plurality of mutually distinct and bounded cultures does give way to a recognition
of greater unity, but extreme multiplicity and fragmentation is still held to be the
hallmark of the African past, the point of departure. Such unity between African
cultures as is being recognised is taken to be the result of the postcolonial phenom-
enon of globalisation, which allows this view to salvage the concept of a pristine
distinctness of a great number of precolonial cultures in Africa.
The dilemma between a universalising method and a fragmenting description,
which Mudimbe is facing here, is not a sign of reproachable weakness on his
part, but appears as an inevitable consequence of academic knowledge production
through written texts. He knows exactly what the dilemma is, as is clear from the
following passage, yet in order to produce a meaningful text he chooses one side of
the contradiction, and leaves the other side for others to articulate:
In the 1950s, the structuralist wave in anthropology attempted, in terms of a critique
that it strived to establish in relation to the West, to be the sign of a respectful gaze on
difference and, in this capacity, maintained that it studied societies that were or are
different – both for themselves and in themselves. Yet, there again, the fundamental
problem remains, namely, in this process, the relationship of Western culture to other
cultures. As Anouar Abdel Malek says, one can affirm methodologically that the
century-old refinement of the means of analysing still does not change the very
nature of the analysis undertaken. In our day, just as in the Age of Enlightenment,
such an analysis falls under the jurisdiction of the will to universalism, under the
assumption that all social phenomena are immediately reducible to a single grid
(Mudimbe 1997: 168f).
To put it in a provocative manner, any Africa researcher should at least pause
momentarily on the following small points in order to ponder his or her scientific
or religious practice. The West created the ‘pagan’ in order to ‘Christianize’, ‘under-
development’ in order to ‘develop’, the ‘primitive’ in order to engage in ‘anthropol-
ogy’ and ‘civilize’. These banalities overlay crushing models that must either be
accepted or re-evaluated (Mudimbe 1997: 169f).
4.2. Death again
After this excursion into the contemporary concept of culture, let us return to a
more ultimate concern: death. On the one hand Mudimbe affirms, against the
tide of the Africanist anthropology of the turn of the twenty-first century CE, the
irreducible plurality of African cultures (the same plurality around which the Colo-
nial Library was built and ordered). Mudimbe’s sympathy for the gems of classic
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anthropology as produced by Fortes, Middleton, Griaule, and de Heusch, as dis-
cussed above, suggests that he sees them as an anthropological opening up to the
liberation of African difference. But as he affirms, a greater liberation still lies in
the realization that death (the central undercurrent in his work) is the hallmark
of cultural purity (the kind of cultural purity affirmed by the classic anthropological
model of ethnic diversity and boundedness), so that the affirmation of cultural
métissité is nothing but the only effective strategy of survival:
Then, strictly speaking, who is not a métis? How can any culture claim the purity of
an absolute and uncontaminated identity, a pure essence, if, by analogically extend-
ing the paradox of an impossible stable identity of the I to a We-subject, we accept
that a pure culture-island will become a corpse-culture? (Mudimbe 1997: 199f).
Perhaps my expression ‘the affirmation of cultural métissité as the only effective
strategy of survival’ applies to Mudimbe’s life in the most literal sense. In the
frankly autobiographical Preface to Parables and Fables (1991a), the idea of
writing in the face of death comes back: in the early 1970s,37 Mudimbe then in
his early thirties was diagnosed to be dying of bone cancer, and in anticipatory defi-
ance of such a fate he wrote three books in five months: Entretailles (poetry, pub-
lished 1973, and dedicated to the memory of his French informally adopted brother
who was also his student, and who died in a motor accident together with his
intended bride), Le Bel immonde (a novel, published 1976, featuring Central
African politics), and L’Autre face du royaume, his first attempt ‘to interrogate
the paradoxes of the social and human sciences (. . .) specifically (. . .) anthropol-
ogy’ (Mudimbe 1973, 1976, 1974). In these three books the total of Mudimbe’s
struggle is contained: the Africa he leaves behind him, Europe which is a
vehicle in his intellectual and existential reorientation, and placeless universal
science which is to become his airy home. The diagnosis of bone cancer proved
wrong, and Mudimbe lived on and became a famous cosmopolitan post-African
scholar. Below I will suggest how it is possible to interpret this episode of death-
fearing creativity along North Atlantic models, as an escape from another,
genuine death: that of African historic culture and religion inside him.
4.3. Métissité
The reader of Tales of Faith, who has increasingly wondered how the author
himself would identify, given his geographical, cultural and academic disciplinary
homelessness, only gradually begins to realise that Mudimbe, too, identifies as of
‘mixed cultural descent’, until he declares so explicitly at the end of the book:
The identity of any individual or human community actualizes itself as a process
through three main ektases:38 temporalization, or a subjective procedure whereby
37 Mudimbe (1991a: x) dates this illness at five years after the submission of his doctoral
dissertation at Louvain in 1970, but since Entretrailles was already published in 1973,
we have to question either this dating, or the claim of that book having been written
within five months before or after Le Bel immonde (published 1976) and L’Autre face
du royaume (published 1974).
38 Ekstasis is a Greek word used by Plato in the sense of ‘extension’.
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an individual or a collective consciousness negotiates the norms for its duration as
being, as well as those of things in the world; reflection, or the incredible assumption
of a reflecting consciousness present in, and separated from, a consciousness
reflected on; finally, the last ektasis, being-for-others, during which the self conflic-
tually apprehends itself outside of itself as an object for others. These experiences of
a consciousness, standing out of itself in order to grasp and comprehend its always
fluctuating identity, show well the impossibility of reducing anyone, any human
culture, to an immobile essence. More importantly, living, acting and believing in
a world in which there is always a history – and there are already other people
preceding me – whatever I do, as Sartre would have said, I accomplish it in relation
to others. I mean precisely that any action is always a consequence of my original
sin, my upsurge in a world where I am not alone: métis, because of my very identity,
which can only be a continuous project towards a transcendence; métis, also, by
being there and evolving in a space – simultaneously real and constructed –
already circumscribed and colonized by others’ history, even when these predeces-
sors or contemporaries of mine are my people. Finally, I am a métis in the very
consciousness of conceiving and apprehending my freedom as both lack and
need actualizing itself simultaneously as a negative and positive praxis that is, a
negative, purposeful activity because it signifies in what it is the negation of a
given; positive, since it is an opening in what is coming. [This follows a quote
from Sartre, 1943/1956: 31.]
Then, strictly speaking, who is not a métis? How can any culture claim the purity of
an absolute and uncontaminated identity, a pure essence, if, by analogically extend-
ing the paradox of an impossible stable identity of the I to a We-subject, we accept
that a pure culture-island will become a corpse-culture?’ (Mudimbe 1997: 199f).
Here the reader’s hunch which has built up throughout the book is finally con-
firmed: Tales of Faith is an unusual narrative, and not a detached exercise in the
history of ideas, not even a philosophical treatise. It is primarily an attempt to
articulate in text a personal autobiographical itinerary, and to assess the end
station of métissité to which it has taken its author. Who am I to question the
success of his efforts, and the credibility of his claims? Let us listen once more
to Mudimbe’s characterisation of Tales of Faith:
‘Tales of Faith is about the strange constructed place I chose in inhabit so that I could
think about the unthinkable: how well the predicament of Sartre’s pessimism in ‘Hell
is other people’, meets the supreme beauty of ‘I am an Other’. The two positions are
inseparable in this space, in which identities are always mixtures facing each other
as competitive projects aimed as, to use Schlegel’s language, an impossible ars
combinatoria – I mean a universal and definitive ‘logical chemistry’ (Mudimbe
1997: 202).
Mudimbe basically writes from a position of homelessness. He spiritually inhabits
his métissité rather than Congo or Africa. Perhaps it was no accident that his 1970
Ph.D. thesis was on the semantics of air, not earth, water, or fire: the least commit-
tal element, suspended between Heaven and Earth which the Egyptian air-god
Shu, their father (one of the first two creatures, whom Atum produced through
masturbation) violently separated from their embrace; the Egyptian hieroglyphic
sign shows a feather followed by phonetic and semantic determinants.
Mudimbe analyzes other people’s Tales, Parables and Fables, Ideas and Inven-
tions, but for his personal needs retreats to the bare and windy rocks of agnosticism.
42 Wim van Binsbergen
His Africa is that of other people, it does not exist as a tangible reality for himself,
but at best constitutes a context for contestation, a laboratory for the politics of the
liberation of difference. I find this a courageous position, which does do justice to
the efforts of Africa-based or Africa-derived subjects as well as to the efforts of
Africanists. One of the most remarkable characteristics of Mudimbe’s recent
writing is his earnest wisdom, which never resorts to cheap attacks, never rushes
to easy victories, always sees a glimpse of value and redemption in even the
most formidable constructions of hegemonic power, including the Colonial
Library itself.
But having said this, let me add that it is also a tragic position, which (apparently
because Africa can no longer be a home to Mudimbe) in its rejection of all intel-
lectual claims of African localities, risks dissolving whatever capacity Africa has
of offering a home, with all the comforts and spiritual technologies of sociability,
reconciliation, diagnosis and healing which a real home entails. The full armour
furnished by literary science, psychoanalysis and Western philosophy, the impress-
ive capability of correctly invoking in one passage from Thucydides, Plutarch,
Heidegger, Sartre, Freud, Foucault, Lévi-Strauss and Lacan as the very household
words they clearly are to him, does not quite dispel the stifling air of emptiness. The
construction of self through the liberation of difference, on which Central African
clerical intellectualism revolves, is a politics of textual performance, not of sub-
stance: asserting difference, not contents, seems to be the game. Ancestral
African forms are completely ignored in the process, for at first Christianity, and
then agnosticism, have rendered them incredible. Identity is an adventure, not an
achievement.
The exemplary clerical intellectuals like Kagame, who have combined the
intellectual articulation of their difference as African intellectuals with a
total relinquishing of African historical religion, are for Mudimbe the real pro-
phets (Mudimbe 1997: 175) of twentieth century Central African religion. By
contrast, prophetism as an aspect of historic African religion is omitted from
Mudimbe’s narrative, and hardly more than an afterthought is spared for the
prophets who have manifestly combined a Christian inspiration with a contin-
ued reliance on a sizeable selection of historic African religion, such as Simon
Kimbangu, Alice Lenshina, the numerous self-styled witchcraft eradicators
who, with a selective and often rapidly eroding Christian specifically Watch-
tower inspiration, flooded the countryside of Central Africa from about 1920
onwards.39
Let us dwell a bit on the notion of cultural métissité, which (although used by
Mudimbe in an English-language book) I propose to translate as ‘the condition
of being of cultural mixed descent’. The concept is borrowed, ultimately from
the French colonial language of race, and more directly from an important critical
reflection upon colonialism and its language, notably Amselle’s seminal discussion
39 van Binsbergen 1981; Fields 1985. Elsewhere Mudimbe takes up the issue of prophetism
in Central Africa at greater length, but along essentially the same lines (Mudimbe 1991a:
1–31).
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of African ethnicity40 as a recent invention within colonial society. Schilder and I
have tried to distance ourselves from the constructivism and presentism associated
with Amselle’s view, albeit in terms which probably created misunderstanding and
which Amselle declared a caricature of his views.41 However this may be, the
concept of métissité has implications which cast a critical light on Mudimbe’s
analysis. In the first place it is a biological metaphor, evoking the necessity of
the blind play of genes, as against the freedom, choice, contingency of cultural
strategies. Mudimbe’s heroes, the clerical intellectuals, could freely contemplate
and reject the idea of parricide on their European clerical superiors and intellectual
predecessors while their historic African allegiance had already been killed by
others then themselves; this shows that the biological metaphor of blind genetic
necessity is misleading. Mudimbe must be aware of this, considering his lucid
and state-of-the-art treatment of race as a biologically non-viable political ideology
in contemporary science and society (Mudimbe 1997: 184f).
The biological metaphor is also misleading for another reason. In the biological
process of genetic mixture, the genotype displays the more or less equitable com-
bination of two sets of identifiable factors (genes, chromosomes), each set making
for either of the original two phenotypes involved; depending on how many differ-
ent genes control the specific traits in the original phenotypes, the features of the
resulting mixed phenotype may range somewhere in between both originals, or
(if few genes are involved and some of the values these genes take are dominant,
others recessive) the mixed phenotype may look rather like one of the two originals.
Neither situation obtains in the case of cultural mixed descent as described by
Mudimbe. There is no evidence that in in the case of these clerical intellectuals
African historic religion and Christianity have somehow achieved an equitable
mixture, or that at least deep down, in subconscious layers of their personalities,
the African cultural elements linger even though these do not directly manifest
themselves in their overt behaviour, in their ‘performance’. What we see is
African clerical intellectuals who have been effectively socialised into a North
Atlantic and increasingly global culture, yet successfully asserting a difference
vis-à-vis their North Atlantic superiors. And this they manage to do, not by publicly
articulating intact and authentic chunks of African traditional religion and incorpor-
ating these into their public conscious lives (they are not overtly praying to their
ancestors, they are not overtly staging puberty rites, they do not engage in
human sacrifice in order to propitiate royal ancestors or luck-bringing familiar
spirits). Their difference is asserted simply by claiming the right to define them-
selves as an irreducibly new form of socio-cultural existence, in which the practi-
cally wholesale adoption of the global model of clerical intellectualism goes hand
in hand with their writing about a small selection of utterly externalised, objectified,
distanced and transformed (in other words, virtualised) images of African
40 Amselle 1990. For a similar view on anglophone and lusophone Africa, cf. Vail 1989.
Cf. Mudimbe 1997: 152.
41 Amselle, intervention at a 1995 seminar at Leiden; Schilder & van Binsbergen 1993; van
Binsbergen 1997b; van Binsbergen 1992b/1994.
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traditional religion. They may re-invoke. through retrodiction, the African spiritual
past provided that they emphatically do not live it anymore, and in that respect their
transformative appropriation of that past is both a departure from and a simple
extension of the so-called Colonial Library which is central to Mudimbe’s argu-
ments on knowledge production under conditions of military and spiritual conquest
in Central Africa. In short, these clerical intellectuals are not of cultural mixed
descent, but they are in fact mutations within the global clerical intellectual
order – mutation here being defined in the original Hugo de Vries sense of a
radical and unsystematic change (in genotype) leading to a radically new and
unpredictable manifestation (in phenotype). These clerical intellectuals represent
a new cultural form, whose Africanness perhaps consists in the somatic and geo-
graphical features of their bearers, and in the geographical provenance of the cul-
tural material they distantly and selectively appropriate and transform in
intellectual text products. Their Africanness scarcely consists in any sort of lived
and professed continuity with the African historic religion. What Mudimbe
describes in Tales of Faith is the emergence of a new local variant of global
culture which has become dominant among the religious, educational and political
elite of Central Africa, with similar forms elsewhere in Africa and in the Third
World in general.
The Library is thus not only the absolute shining power in terms of classification of
beings and things but the locus in which all knowledge transmutes itself into science.
(. . .) From this perspective, colonial sciences (. . .) assure both the universality and
absolute validity of the Western historical experience, and hence the imperativeness
of African conversion to its solidity and logic (Mudimbe 1997: 179f).
This is very different, and far more penetrating and convincing, than Horton’s
‘African conversion’ argument which was launched in the early 1970s and
greatly influenced the Ranger school of African religious history: the idea that
African conversion to world religions in the late precolonial period simply fitted
in with the widening up of political, social and economic horizons in the African
countryside, since only a monotheistic High God was commensurate to those
new secular realities (Horton 1971, 1975). But again, Mudimbe seems to do
himself to African historic religion what he exposes as a colonial hegemonic strat-
egy: does he not himself, vis-à-vis African historic religion, assert, like the very
Colonial Library he is critiquing in the above quotation, ‘both the universality
and absolute validity of the Western historical experience, and hence the impera-
tiveness of African conversion to its solidity and logic?’ (Mudimbe 1997: 179f).
The point is not that Mudimbe’s understanding of the conversion process is to be
faulted. Most illuminatingly he argues that this process consists of a triple negation:
of otherness, of the plurality of histories, and of any rationality to be found outside
the respectable Judaeo-Greek philosophical canon (Mudimbe 1997: 147). He
demonstrates how in a nineteenth century North Atlantic thought spell-bound by
Hegel, which does not allow for a plurality of histories, Africa does not and
cannot exist. The point is that Mudimbe does not seem to realise that his very
critique of this conversion process, which produced him and hence has taken on
a personal reality from which he can as little detach himself as from his body or
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from the air (!) he breathes, overdetermines him to take such deconstructive,
dismissive views of Africa and of African historic religion as he does take:
‘Consequently, conversion is an imperative, a sine qua non condition for inscribing
oneself into a history’ (Mudimbe 1997: 59).
Of course Mudimbe means this statement as a rendering of the hegemonic pre-
conceptions of missionary Christianity. But that does not take away the fact that, in
banning African historic religion from the substance of his argument, denying it
rationality, repeatedly dismissing it as incredible as if it can be totally assessed
by epistemological criteria, and in glorifying the project of clerical and post-
clericalintellectualism from which his own career and mutant identity have
sprung, he takes the personal fact and necessity of such conversion for granted.
5. Mudimbe and historic African religion
Remarkably, I have not yet spotted any passage in Mudimbe’s oeuvre (but I may
easily have missed it considering its size and bilingual nature) where the concept
of parricide is equally applied to the unmistakable lack of demonstrable retention
of any historic Central African religion on the part of these clerics and post-clerics
(like Mudimbe himself). They tended to be second or third generation Christians,
and hence one might surmise that others had done the killing of local historic reli-
gion for them: their own parents, and the missionaries who had somehow managed
to substitute themselves as father figures in the place of the paternal kin of these
African clerical intellectuals. The message, so implicit as to be entirely taken for
granted, of Mudimbe’s kaleidoscopic and multi-genre narrative of the itinerary
of these African clerical intellectuals in his book Tales of Faith, is that by the
middle of the twentieth century none of them was in direct personal contact any
more, as a practitioner, with Central African historic religion. Kagame’s search
as a student at the major seminary, after La philosophie bantu-rwandaise de
l’Être (Kagame 1955), was a retrieval, a reconstruction on the basis of deliberate
research. Mudimbe had to base his own highly recommendable close readings
of Congolese myth of genesis and other historic religious texts on an experience
testifying to his cultural homelessness:
My experience would define itself somewhere between the practice of philosophy
with its possible intercultural applications42 and the sociocultural and intersubjective
space which made me possible: my Luba-Lulua mother, my Songye father, the
Swahili cultural context of my primary education in Katanga (Shaba), the Sanga
milieu of my secondary education from 1952 to 1959 in Kakanda, near Jadotville
(Likasi), and, later on, at the Catholic seminary of Mwera, near what was then
Elisabethville, and my brief sojourn in a Benedictine monastery in Rwanda
(Mudimbe 1991: 124f).43
42 Elsewhere in the same book Mudimbe is to declare his ‘indebtedness to Willy Bal.
Thirty years ago, he taught me how to read a text with a philologist’s eye, and later
on, at Louvain, he patiently introduced me to the art of reading as a demanding under-
taking’ (Mudimbe 1991a: xxii). Cf. Bal 1963.
43 Part of the same quotation was used in a footnote above when Mudimbe’s claim to
ethnographic authority was presented.
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Beyond what is implied and hidden in such local languages as one learns to speak
as a child and a teenager, one can hope to inherit but very little of historic African
religion in such an itinerary from the age of five or six on. It is therefore unlikely
that, instead of the previous killing of this paternal culture by others, a different
mythical scheme should be invoked here: African historic religion, Africa in
general as a myth and a concept, does not consciously appear here as the mother
however prominent that image is in the construction of that continent by writers
as diverse as Basil Davidson (1961) and the Afrocentrist ben-Jochanan (1988).
There appears to be no deliberate maternal imagery of Africa in Mudimbe’s
work, no attempt to direct a filial mystique of love and identification upon the
idea of that continent. Only by gross imposition might one interpret Mudimbe’s
consistent, repeated, and relentless deconstruction of the idea of Africa in his
two best known books (The Invention of Africa, 1988; and The Idea of Africa,
1994) as an attempt at matricide. Meanwhile his consistent refusal to celebrate
Africa as the self-evident focus of Black identity and even – in terms of strong
Afrocentrism – as the source of all human civilisation might be interpreted as
fratricide by the many African American, and African, Afrocentrists holding
such views.44 I am inclined to read Mudimbe’s relation to historic African religion,
and to Africa in general, in terms of a still different myth: one which derives from
the domain of African male puberty rites, and which amounts to the fact that the
son dies vis-à-vis the mother, and the mother and her world vis-à-vis the son, at
the moment that the son sets out to be initiated in the sacred forest, access to
which is forbidden to women. His clerical education and subsequent clerical
(albeit briefly) and Western intellectual career have constituted for Mudimbe an
initiation by virtue of which historic African religion has died on him. It is as
the familiar case of the priestly son from a humble rural family in the Roman
Catholic, Southern regions of the Netherlands or in Belgium: he visits the
house of his mother, and by virtue of his now incomparably elevated status –
considered to have left an indelible mark on his soul at ordination – has
become an exalted and condescending stranger there, rendered taboo by the
almost untenable sacredness which his direct link with Rome and heaven bestow
upon him.
In itself, the Colonial Library is not so much about preserving past or present narra-
tives, customs and knowledge as constituting a body or bodies having in their own
right a particular quality inscribed in a given history, but about bringing together
these things and collapsing them in a ‘primitive background’ that a new universe
(the colonial) and a new cosmology (conversion) can translate and transform into
an advanced modernity. (. . .) It seems clear that both the Western savoirs des
simples as well as the African invented primitive backgrounds could be understood
as refused knowledges – that is, as the tragic necessity of an ill-known desire whose
origin comes from elsewhere (Mudimbe 1997: 176).
44 Berlinerblau 1999; Fauvelle-Aymar et al. 2000; Howe 1999. My review article around
the first book is forthcoming in Journal of African History, I have a contribution on the
Black Athena debate in the second book, and defended Afrocentrism against the third
book in van Binsbergen 2000a.
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That is magnificently formulated, but it is also precisely what Mudimbe does to
African historic religion: reduce it to the status of ‘refused knowledge’.
Spending many pages to arrive at an original definition of religion which should
be capable of capturing a finely tuned and critically purified ‘primitive’ religion
characterised by the ‘midnight zero qualities of ipse-ity’ (Mudimbe 1997: 25),
Mudimbe never comes round to applying such a definition to Central Africa in
order to identify and discuss forms of African historic religion there, but only
describes the conversionist and unavoidably distorting appropriations of these
forms in the hands of anthropologists, missionaries, and (in a process of creative
retrodiction, by which they liberate and assert their difference) by African clerical
and post-clerical intellectuals.
Admittedly, the fact that Mudimbe concentrates on varieties of Christianity
and scarcely touches on African historic religion, is to some extent a consequence
of a theoretical position which includes Christianity and historic African religion
alike:
The reconversion – which is actually a rupture – from a psychological to a socio-
logical model and then to Lévy-Bruhl’s anthropological paradigm, exerts an influ-
ence upon the way we read the reality of African religions today. The traditional
readings are not rendered as part of a cultural order sui generis but, indeed, as
signs and proofs of something else, namely, epistemological categories unfolding
from an intellectual configuration completely alien to the cultural spaces they
claim to reflect (Mudimbe 1997: 16).45
African historic religion does however enter the argument of Tales of Faith to the
extent to which it was appropriated, by certain missionary authors, into Christian-
ity, as a preparatio Evangelii, a stepping-stone towards the Gospel (ibid.: 76f).
Such liberation of the oppressed as the learned Cameroonian pastor Ela envisages
through his missionary work among his fellow Cameroonians, takes local religious
practices seriously and leads to a ‘sometimes iconoclastic ambition’ (ibid.: 80)
directed as the empty fetishes of missionary Christianity – but what goes unnoticed
is the far greater iconoclasm that all but eclipsed African historic religion from visi-
bility in Central Africa. The oppressed poor scarcely manage to summon
Mudimbe’s passion: distantly or even callously, he calls Ela’s commitment to
their cause ‘fascinating’ (ibid.: 82)!
When Mudimbe speaks of ‘an incredible miracle’ and identifies as an agnostic,
he evokes the epistemological impossibility of religious belief as a rational pos-
ition. St Augustine’s credo quia absurdum, in Latin, would be a typical phrase
for the post-clerical classicist Mudimbe, to embellish his French or English
prose. Yet at least two points can be made in defence of African historic religion,
so that it does not have to be crushed under the impact of allegedly universal epi-
stemologies from the North Atlantic. The first point I shall explain by reference to
common anthropological ethnocentrism in the study of African religion; the second
point is made by Mudimbe himself, relying on de Certeau.
45 The same point is taken up again in detail (ibid.: 159f). What this really says is that
European text on African religion will always be alien and alienating.
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My first point is that Mudimbe’s insistence on the incredible nature of both
Christianity and African historic religion reiterates a position which is basically
ethnocentric and hegemonic. Regrettably, that position coincides with that habitu-
ally taken in the anthropological study of African religion.
In cultural anthropology statements of certain types are eligible to be assessed as
true or false:
– the ethnographer’s statement to the effect that her ethnographic description of
concrete emic details is valid;
– the ethnographer’s statement to the effect that her theoretical, etic analysis is
valid;
– the individual informants’ statements that they render fact, representations and
rules validly.
There is however a fourth type of statement which cultural anthropologist
absolutely exclude from the question concerning truth:
– the participants’ statement that their collective representations are a valid
description of reality (both in its sensory and in its meta-sensory aspect,
visible and invisible etc.).
Following the later Wittgenstein Winch has show us that the truth of the latter type
of statement cannot be established in general and universally, but depends on the
language-specific, meaning-defining form of life which is at hand. Whether in a
certain society witches do or do not exist, cannot be answered with the universal
statement that witches do exist, or do not exist, but can only be answered by refer-
ence to the specific life-forms at hand in that society – and of such life forms there
are always more than one at the same time and place (Winch 1970: 100f; Sogolo,
1993; Jarvie 1972). Now, cultural relativism as a central profession point of
departure of classic anthropology may perhaps mean, theoretically, that the
exclusion of this fourth category depends on respect for whatever is true in the
other life form or cultural orientation; but in practice it nearly always comes
down to the following. However much the ethnographer has invested in the acqui-
sition of linguistic and cultural knowledge so that local collective representations
can be unsealed for her, and however much she gradually internalises these
collective representations as a private person – in her professional formal utter-
ances (in the forms of academic writing-up) she does not allow the collective
representations she has studied, the benefit of the doubt, nor the respect she
pretends to be due to the collectively other.
The tacit point of departure of the cultural anthropological professional practice
(and in this respect it does not distance itself from North Atlantic society as a
whole) is: Collective representations of other societies under study cannot be
true, unless they coincide one hundred percent with the collective representations
of the researcher’s own society of origin. Of course, both the researcher’s society of
origin and the cultural orientation under study construct a truth-creating life
world – which is a situation suggestive of a relativist approach. But according to
the conventions of ethnography such a life world may be one-sidedly broken
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down if it is the other’s life world, and left intact when it is the researcher’s own.
Just try to realise what this means for the confrontation, throughout the modern
world, in institutional, political and media settings, between such major and power-
ful North Atlantic institutional complexes as democracy, medicine, education,
Christianity, and pre-existing local alternatives in the respective fields. Anthropol-
ogists may pay lip service to the latter from a humanitarian and aesthetic point of
view but – they for their own sanity and professional survival they have to abide by
the adage that they cannot be true. Let us have a look at myself as an example.
Born in the Netherlands (1947), I was trained at the university of my home town
as an anthropologist specialising in religion. From my first fieldwork (1968), when I
investigated saint worship and the ecstatic cult in rural North Africa, I have
struggled with this problem – which I am inclined to consider as the central
problem of interculturality. With gusto I sacrificed to the dead saints in their
graves, danced along with the ecstatic dancers, experienced the beginning of mys-
tical ecstasy myself, built an entire network of fictive kinsmen around. Yet in my
ethnography I reduced the very same people to numerical values in a quantitative
analysis, and I knew of no better way to describe their religious representations than
as the denial of North Atlantic or cosmopolitan natural science (van Binsbergen
1985a; 1980; 1985b). It was only twenty years later when, in the form of a novel
(Een Buik Open – Opening a Belly – 1988) I found the words to testify to my
love for and indulgence in the North African life forms which I had had to keep
at a distance as an ethnographer; and my two-volume, English-language book
manuscript on this research is still lying idly on a shelf. In the course of many
years and several African fieldwork locations, always operating in the religious
and the therapeutic domain, I gradually began to realise that I loathed the
cynical professional attitude of anthropology, and that I had increasingly difficulty
sustaining that attitude. Who was I that I could afford to make believe, to pretend,
wherever the undivided serious commitment of my research participants was
involved? Several among them have played a decisive role in my life, as examples,
teachers, spiritual masters, lovers. In Guinea-Bissau, in 1983, I did not remain the
observer of the oracular priests but I became their patient – like nearly all the born
members of the local society were. In the town of Francistown, Botswana, from
1988, under circumstances which I have discussed at length elsewhere (van
Binsbergen 1991; 1998) – the usual advice for fieldwork became so insupportable
to me that I had to throw overboard all professional considerations. I became not
only the patient of local diviner-priests (sangomas), but at the end of a long
therapy course ended up as one of them, and thus as a believer in the local collective
representations. At the time I primarily justified this as a political deed, for me as a
white man in an area which had been disrupted by white monopoly capitalism.
Now more than then I realise that it was also and primarily an epistemological
position-taking – a revolt against the professional hypocrisy in which the hegemo-
nic perspective of anthropology reveals itself. It was a position-taking which in fact
expelled me from cultural anthropology (although I did go by my own choice) and
which created the conditions for the step which I finally made when occupying my
present chair in intercultural philosophy.
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This step means a liberation, not only from an empirical habitus which, along
with existential distress, has also yielded me plenty of intellectual delight, adven-
ture, and honours; but also liberation from such far-reaching spiritual dependence
from my mentors and fellow cult members as originally characterised my sangoma-
hood. Becoming a sangoma was a concrete, practical deed in answer to the contra-
dictions of a practice of intercultural knowledge production which I had engaged in
for decades, with increasing experience and success. Becoming an intercultural
philosopher means a further step: one that amounts to integrating that deed in a
systematic, reflective and intersubjective framework, in order to augment the anec-
doctal, autobiographical ‘just so’ account with theoretical analysis, and to explore
the social relevance of an individual experience. For what is at stake here is not
merely an autobiographical anecdote. If I struggled with intercultural knowledge
production, then my problem coincides with that of the modern world as a
whole, where intercultural knowledge production constitutes one of the two or
three greatest challenges. If it is possible for me to be at the same time a Botswana
sangoma, a Dutch professor, husband and father, and an adoptive member of a
Zambian royal family, while at the same time burdened by sacrificial obligations,
cultural affinities and fictive kin relationships from North and West Africa, then this
does not just say something, about me (a me that is tormented, post-modern, bound-
less, one who has lost his original home but found new physical and spiritual homes
in Africa). Provided we take the appropriate distance and apply the appropriate
analytical tools, it also says something about whatever ‘culture’ is and what it is
not. It implies that culture is not bounded, not tied to a place, not unique but mul-
tiple, not impossible to combine, blend and transgress, not tied to a body, an ethnic
group, a birth right. And it suggests that ultimately we are much better off as
nomads between a plurality of cultures, than as self-imposed prisoners of a smug
Eurocentrism.
So far for the argument from intercultural epistemology. The second point is
much shorter. According to de Certeau (quoted with great approval by
Mudimbe) religion is not only thwarted epistemology but also action by which
an incredible belief is rendered credible:
The ambiguity of theological projects cannot but lead us back to an essential
question: how can we comprehend the credibility of Christianity in the Third
World? The late Michel de Certeau notes in The practice of everyday life (1984)
that ‘the credibility of a discourse is what first makes believers act in accord with
it. It produces practitioners. To make people believe is to make them act . . . etc.’
(Mudimbe 1997: 82f; de Certeau 1984: 148).
Mudimbe uses this convincing line of thought with relation to missionary Chris-
tianity, which is unmistakably incredible for the agnostic that he repeatedly pro-
fesses to be at this point in his life, and which he claims to have been at least
since his 1968 days at Paris-Nanterre.46 But why does Mudimbe allow this
46 ‘At Nanterre (. . .) I did not hide the fact that I was then a practicing Catholic, although,
philosophically, agnostic.’ (Mudimbe 1991a: ix). He can hardly have been an agnostic
when he stayed at the Catholic seminary of Mwere near Lubumbashi in the early 1960s,
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explanation to apply exclusively to Christianity in Africa, and not to African
historic religion which is rendered credible in praxis in essentially the same way?
Meanwhile an alternative interpretation presents itself of Mudimbe’s presumed
bone cancer, its being an illusion based on misdiagnosis, the explosion of creativity
in all his genres of text production (poetry, novel, essay in the philosophy of
science), and the subsequent disappearance of the symptoms. Described thus, we
have an event rendered in the global language of medical rationality (which
however misfired, in this case) and academic and literary book production. I
would read the case very differently as an African diviner-priest with thirty years
of experience in a cultural setting, the Nkoya people of Western Central Zambia,
with strong cultural, migratory and linguistic links with the Luba people from
Congo (with whom Mudimbe identifies on his mother’s side). In the cosmology
of Central Africa, bones are constituted of the ancestors’ coagulated sperm,
which may be symbolised as white beads, or as the diviner’s bones on which diag-
nosis is based. Having converted lock, stock and barrel to an alien world-view, to
clerical intellectualism of a global signature and North Atlantic orientation,
Mudimbe’s ancestral heritage could be said to be dying – culturally in the sense
that beyond the Luba and possibly Songye language he allowed hardly anything
of the ancestral culture to remain part of his life, and physically in that his very
bones were giving signs of literally decaying. However, that conversion was not
an illusion but a fact, and it allowed him to tap – through the act of textual creation
– such vital spiritual and physical resources for transformation and reconstruction
of self, as were residing in another, at least equally powerful world-view, the one to
which he had converted. And there the true miracle happened: the bone cancer
which at one stage was not an illusion based on misdiagnosis, but a fact, was
arrested by the creative transformation which Mudimbe unleashed in these five
months, what had been alienation from an ancestral heritage until then had
become an authentic source of life, and he survived to become the most successful,
famous, profound and heroic representative of the new category of cultural con-
verts which make up a sizeable proportion of today’s African intellectuals, a veri-
table métis.
If African historic religion is no longer the dominant cohesive social force in the
urban and intellectual context of Kinshasa, Lubumbashi and other Congolese cities,
this does not mean that such religion has entirely disappeared from the contempor-
ary Congolese social life in the rural areas; recent ethnographic research by accom-
plished ethnographers like Devisch and de Boeck has demonstrated its continued
vitality and viability (de Boeck 1991a; de Boeck & Devisch 1994; Devisch
1984; 1986; 1991; Devisch & Brodeur 1999).
If African historic religion has succeeded in surviving to some extent in the
countryside of Central Africa, why is it far less conspicuous in the big cities? As
in Belgium, Roman Catholicism was something of a state religion in Belgian
or when he entered a Rwandan Benedictine convent as a novice, but from the latter he
soon resigned (Mudimbe 1997: 137); cf. also Mudimbe 1991a: 125, ‘my brief sojourn’.
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Congo, Rwanda and Burundi. This does not mean that there is a 100% overlap
between the religious and the statal domain; for as Mudimbe acknowledges the
Central African colonies, like Belgium, had a certain plurality of European ideo-
logical expressions (Protestantism, Freemasonry, and one may add socialism)
rival to Roman Catholicism, and some of them with rather disproportionately
great power in national politics. However, the effect of the practical coinciding
of state and world religion is a particular form of micropolitics, which has a
direct bearing on the eclipse of religious alternatives to Roman Catholicism from
public and even private life. There is a constant reinforcing between statal and reli-
gious sanctioning in the policing of citizen’s everyday life. The state, which in its
twentieth century form is primarily a democratically legitimated oligarchy,
assumes reality partly through the citizen’s submission to and veneration of the rep-
resentations of the church; and the intangible sanctions of the church somehow
receive a vicarious backing from the display of physical force (the prison, the
police, the army) and the powerful bureaucratic procedures proper to the state.
The Enlightenment rationality of the modern state nicely matches the verbose
doctrinal rationalisations of Roman Catholic theology. The result of all this is
that in the consciousness and practices of the citizens all heterodoxy tends to be
shunned as criminal and as an act of national treason, by virtue of strongly inter-
nalised modes of assessment, self-control, and domestication. In everyday
Belgian life especially outside the big cities, even Protestantism may be seen in
this heterodox light, and so are certainly the expressions of ‘paganism’, be they
European, African, or from a different extraction. (For that very same reason
they also invite common fascination as expressions of defiance of a paternalistic,
unaccountable, and increasingly inefficient state, as e.g. the Dutroux affair, the
Nijvel gang, and even the middle- and upper-class appeal of Freemasonry would
suggest). Heterodoxy instils the ordinary law-abiding citizen with a sense of
horror and especially shame, comparable to the shame adults feel in cases of imper-
fect public concealment of their own bodily functions (signs of incontinence, of
menstruation leaking through, etc.). In a system of evaluation along such axes as
child versus adult, animal versus human, stupid versus intelligent, exclusion
versus inclusion, punishment versus reward, heterodoxy thus installs itself on the
negative end. Mudimbe is as good a guide as any critic of colonialism to identify
these social pressures towards compliance with world-religion orthodoxy, but it is
important to realise that these pressures are not limited to the colonial situation.
They can still be seen to work in post-colonial African societies: among the citizens
as a mode of acquiescence; while among the political elite the semi-secret semi-
public display of heterodox horrors (for instance in the occasional display of vio-
lence, sorcery, and human sacrifice) reinforces such acquiescence, since these
horrors are profoundly threatening to the citizens (Toulabor 2000). Therefore, in
the public culture of Central Africa from at least the middle of the twentieth
century if not earlier, much as in the public culture of Botswana, considerable sec-
tions of the population (especially the urbanites and middle classes) are effectively
shielded off from African historic religion by an effective screen of internalised
shame. In Zambia in the early 1970s I detected (as a younger and less sensitive
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observer) nothing similar, but over the past thirty years I have seen the gradual
installation of a precisely such a screen. Today this altered state of affairs occasion-
ally makes me appear a social fool in that country, when unthinkingly I publicly
mediate a historic African religious identity as someone who has obviously not
permanently resided in the country recently, whose main Zambian identity was
formed in one of the rural areas of central western Zambia in the early 1970s
when African historic religion was still a dominant idiom there, who subsequently
became a diviner-priest in Botswana according to a religious idiom which
meanwhile has gained considerable public currency in Zambia as well, and
therefore as someone who does not always realise that it is no longer socially
acceptable to mediate African historic religion in the public space of the town
and the open road.
One may wonder why Mudimbe should stop, as he does, at the evocation of the
few heroes and saints of the cultural mutant order of clerical intellectualism
(Kagame, Kizerbo, Mulago, Mveng), and not trace the installation of that mutant
order throughout Central African society in the second half of the twentieth
century. With the general spread of formal education (however low its level),
and the prominence of clerical intellectuals in the educational system, the main
conditions were set for the percolation of (admittedly attenuated, compromised,
versions of) this mutant order far outside the seminaries, convents and universities
where it was originally engendered, to become, perhaps, a standard cultural orien-
tation among tens, possibly hundreds of thousands of people of the urban middle
class in Central Africa. Did this happen? If it did, how did this influence the pol-
itical and religious itinerary of the societies of Congo, Rwanda and Burundi in the
second half of the twentieth century? If it did, how did it help to explain Mobutu-
ism, its politics of authenticity (which, much like clerical intellectualism,
amounted to a virtualisation and thus effectively an annihilation of historical
African culture and religion), the specific form of proliferation of church organis-
ations which took place in Congo, and the general emergence of a contemporary
social order in which Christianity and literacy have become the norm, and
African historic religion has been eclipsed or at best has gone underground,
mainly to emerge in highly selective and virtualised form in certain practices of
African Independent churches. Is perhaps the violence (more specifically the
death) which forms the refrain of Mudimbe’s spiritual itinerary, and which I am
inclined to interpret as the murder of African historic religion, akin to the
extreme and extremely massive violence which has swept Congo, Burundi and
Rwanda throughout the second half of the twentieth century? Anthropologists
like Devisch and de Lame have struggled with the interpretation of the latter
form of violence in Central Africa (Devisch 1996; 1995; de Lame 1996), and
their sociological interpretations, while adding a social scientific dimension to
the psychoanalytical and philosophical hermeneutics of Mudimbe, certainly do
ring somewhat naive in the light of Mudimbe’s essayistic philosophising,
although the latter does lack sociological imagination and manifests the literature
scholar’s disinclination to think in terms of large-scale social categories and their
institutions.
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This means that we might yet take seriously Mudimbe’s claim that Tales of
Faith is about any post-colonial individual (Mudimbe 1997: 198), and not just
about himself and a handful of fellow clerical and post-clerical intellectuals from
Central Africa. Despite his exceptional erudition, cosmopolitan orientation, and
success, Mudimbe’s predicament is to a considerable extent that of the contempor-
ary Central African middle classes in general. A glimpse of what lies at today’s
far end of the itinerary that started with Kagame c.s., may be gathered from the
following impression, which I owe entirely to the ongoing Ph.D. research of
Julie Duran-Ndaya:
In July, 2000, Kinshasa was the scene of a major church conference of the Combat
Spirituel (Spiritual Combat) movement. The conference involved close to 20,000
people, many of whom had travelled to Kinshasa from western Europe and other
places of the Congolese diaspora. Obviously we are dealing here with a highly sig-
nificant social phenomenon at a massive scale. The movement caters for upper
middle class and professional people, especially women. Women also play leading
roles in the movement’s organisation. The movement’s doctrine and ritual
combine an original re-reading of the Bible with techniques of self-discovery and
self-realisation under the direction of female leaders. The spiritual battle which
members have to engage in, is a struggle for self-realisation in the face of any
kind of negations or repressions of personal identity, especially such as are often
the fate of ambitious middle-class women in diasporic situations. In order to
achieve this desired self-realisation, it is imperative that all existing ties with the
past, as embodied in the traditional cultural norms of historic Central African
society, and as represented by the ancestors, are literally trampled underfoot. Thus
a major part of regular church ritual is to go through the motions of vomiting
upon evocations of the ancestors, and of violently and repeatedly stamping on
their representations. The catharsis which this is to bring about is supposed to
prepare one for the modern, hostile world. Some members experience very great
difficulty in thus having to violently exorcise figures and symbols of authority and
identity which even in the diffuse, virtualised kinship structure of urban Congolese
society today have been held in considerable respect. But while this predicament
suggests at least some resilience of historic African religion (otherwise there
would be no hesitation at trampling the past and the ancestors), it is practically
impossible for diasporic Congolese to tap, for further spiritual guidance, the
resources of historic African religion in the form of divination, therapy and
protective medicine: not one reliable and qualified Congolese specialist in historic
African religion (nganga) is to be found in, for instance, The Netherlands or
Belgium.47
The make-up of this topical situation is reminiscent of that of the clerical intellec-
tual mutation half a century ago: the literate and Christian format appropriated as
self-evident yet subjected to personal selective transformation, the rejection of an
ancestral past and of African traditional religion, the total inability to derive any
spiritual resources from the latter, and the effect of being propelled into a mutant
cosmopolitan cultural and spiritual solution which is African by the adherent orig-
inal geography and biology, but not in substance.
47 This passage based on Duran-Ndaya 1999. I am grateful for the many discussions I had
with Mrs Duran-Ndaya on her fascinating ongoing Ph.D. research.
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6. A comparison between Mudimbe’s itinerary and my own
My own intellectual itinerary started out from a different but similar initial position,
for a long time ran parallel to Mudimbe’s but precisely with regard to African
historic religion reached the opposite point, largely because this was not part of
my historic cultural heritage as it might have been of his. Let me therefore, in
conclusion, seek to illuminate Mudimbe’s trajectory by offsetting it against
my own.
Mudimbe is a capable, creative and courageous thinker – one who can stand the
vertigo of high anxiety, being fundamentally homeless and alone without other
illusions than the quest for a placeless science and truth. To him, the rest is ‘incred-
ible’, is belles lettres. Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith amount to an ‘act of faith’ in the
sense of auto-da-fé, the most terrible destructive act to which Roman Catholicism
as a regime of control was capable of. The transmutation which produced clerical
intellectualism and thus gave us Mudimbe, was also an auto-da-fé eradicating
historic African religion from visibility and accessibility in Central African life
today.
And myself: Like Mudimbe, I started out in life (1947) from a global periphery,
in my case an urban slum in Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Like Mudimbe, I owed
my excellent secondary education to the Roman Catholic church mission (which
was active in the slum by operating a community centre and chapel), was a choir
boy, and soon appropriated the primacy of literate text production which is inherent
in that situation by writing poetry at a professional, publishable level of accom-
plishment. Like Mudimbe, I shed whatever ancestral culture I could have inherited.
I did so because, like Mudimbe, I was co-opted into a higher social class with a
much more open window on globally circulating culture; and in my case there
was an additional reason which may or may not have obtained in Mudimbe’s
case: the terror of physical and sexual violence which my father exercised over
the family in which I grew up, and my mother’s ambivalent attitude concerning
this state of affairs, installed parricide as my central conscious desire ever since I
was seven years old – the main topic also of my praying requests to God. A rejec-
tion of my father’s urban slum culture was the main socially accepted means of car-
rying out such parricide. Like Mudimbe, I became a student, accomplished
member, and philosophical critic of colonial and postcolonial anthropology.
Even though, as in Mudimbe’s case, the Roman Catholic church provided the
main venue of secondary education and globally circulating refined civilised
culture (belles lettres, classical music, in general the tastes and styles of the
polite global public), there was no need for me to pursue the priesthood: not
only had I lost my once ardent faith when fifteen year old, but also, as I was
nearing graduation from secondary school, a large number of academic and
other career opportunities opened up for me in a democratic complex urban
North Atlantic society eagerly expanding the ranks of its middle classes by co-opta-
tion from among the working classes; however, with a head-start on me of half a
generation earlier my half-brother had started on an ecclesiastic career soon abor-
tive, and for others from the rural and Roman Catholic South of the Netherlands
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(like my friend and final Ph.D. supervisor Matthew Schoffeleers) this was the
obvious road to social and cultural upward mobility – as it was for Mudimbe in
colonial and early postcolonial Congo.
Without much noticeable bitterness, deliberately refusing to proceed to parricide
vis-à-vis his European superiors and the ideals of culture and scholarship they stood
for, Mudimbe was emancipated from an abortive ecclesiastic career (he was a Ben-
edictine novice in Rwanda) in order to become a post-clerical intellectual, first in
France, subsequently back in Congo and finally in the United States, increasingly
consolidating the post-African global cultural mutation which he and his peers
represented.
My own itinerary through academia, though also marked with early successes
(acting Professor of African Anthropology, Leiden, 1976; Simon Professor of
Anthropology, Manchester, 1980; Academic Co-director of the African Studies
Centre, Leiden, 1980), and marked by the same lack of anticlerical resentment
combined with agnosticism, was far less than Mudimbe’s a successful retreat
into a largely self-constructed global home. On the contrary, my academic
career was full of insecurities, doubts, conflicts, and ruptures. Although anthropol-
ogy, and scientific rationality in general (partly under the influence of my first wife,
a physicist) unleashed an indefatigable passion in me from the first moment when,
as a third year student, I was prompted to combine theoretical analysis with
empirical ethnographic research, strangely throughout the 1970s and 1980s my
first subjective identity remained that of a poet and a literary prose writer, who
approached his academic writing with cynicism as a form of routinised production
inherently incapable of redemption or truth; who constantly defied the conventions
of polite academic life in frequent attempts at fratricide and parricide, wasting
three academic supervisors before finally defending my Ph.D. thesis on Religious
change in Zambia under the aegis of an ex-missionary who had been part of
Mudimbe’s Central African intellectual scene himself, Matthew Schoffeleers;
and who proved incapable of observing a healthy objectifying distance as an
anthropologist in the field. This culminated in the early 1990s, when in the
course of fieldwork into the culture of a northeastern Botswana boom town
(Francistown) as a meeting place between the African historic culture, and globally
mediated culture, I was for the first time given an African spiritual home, in the
course of a long and painful therapy in the ecstatic religion that is one of the
main spiritual expressions in that part of the world; at the end I came out as a prac-
tising sangoma.
My emphatic witnessing to this step in professional and public contexts made
clear that it was not just another field-work strategy in the pursuit of secret infor-
mation, but a deliberate denial of the objectifying, implicitly hegemonic rationality
of anthropology – a parting parricide. This triggered a series of further intellectual
dislocations. My Marxist-inspired structural-functionalism gave way to a highly
unpopular search for comprehensive connections in space and time, linking the
Southern African divination system I had been trained in as a sangoma, to the
magic and science of West Africa, Islam, Ancient Greece, the Ancient Near
East, and China. I joined the Black Athena debate, began to explore its implication
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for our image of Africa, and increasingly identified as a supporter and defender of
Afrocentrism. All this required me to leave anthropology and Central African
religious history, and my patrons in these fields, effectively behind (a further par-
ricide) and to take up or resume philological, historical, and epistemological
studies, Assyriology, Egyptology, archaeology, astronomy even, far beyond the
paradigmatic and geographical parochialism of my earlier Africanist anthropology.
While my becoming a sangoma had been an intuitive and highly emotional gesture,
I struggled to gradually bring out its epistemological and political implications.
From an anthropologist, I became a philosopher, eligible to the Rotterdam chair
of intercultural philosophy; needless to say my predecessor gave signs of experien-
cing my succession as parricidal. The Rotterdam position continues to be combined
with empirical Africanist anthropological research at Leiden, poetry and sangoma-
hood at my new Haarlem home in the Netherlands (where I frequent the sangoma
shrine in my backyard) and when in Africa. Complex struggles seek to attune these
identities to the role expectations and existential predicaments of Dutch–Belgian
family life. Meanwhile in the course of the 1990s I was finally granted, but soon
lost again, another African home as an adoptive son of King Kahare Kabambi of
the Nkoya people of Zambia, a Luba-related group among whom I have done
research since the early 1970s.
Both Mudimbe and myself have ended up, from socially very peripheral points
of departure, in a secure central North Atlantic position, cherishing the comforting
qualified universalism that comes with academia, philosophy, classics, belles
lettres. For Mudimbe, the African heritage that was never to be his (because the
micropolitics of clerical education denied him access to and accomplishment in
African historic religion) continues to intrigue him. He has made it its life’s
work to pinpoint the intellectual history and philosophical implications of these
micropolitics, and to define, critique and increasingly control through his highly
influential writings, how the image of Africa has been constructed and should be
deconstructed. He has become the most qualified, almost plenipotentiary censor
of his own spiritual and cultural loss as a post-African. For him, the Africa of his-
toric local religious forms is a domain of the imaginary, of make-believe: fable,
tale, myth, performance etc.
I feel that Mudimbe is stating only one side of the story. He has fallen victim
to what we might call the deceptive politics of translocalisation, much as I have
fallen victim to the deceptive politics of locality by becoming and remaining a
sangoma (cf. Appadurai 1995; de Jong 2001; van Binsbergen 1991, 1988). The
gods I pray to in a loosely African fashion (some of them as particular as my
own or my patients’ ancestors, others tending to universality such as Mwali, or
the Virgin Mary, or the God whose mother she is) do not need an epistemological
validation because the rite turns them from imaginary into real and into social facts
which make a difference since they decisively govern the behaviour of sizeable sets
of people.
There is one point in Tales of Faith where Mudimbe comes close to articulating
and analysing a movement similar to my own: when he discusses the French
Jesuit missionary de Rosny who after a quarter of a century of work in Cameroon
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published a famous book on his initiation there as a diviner-priest (nganga) (Rosny
1981; 1992: 31f):
There is more: ‘and yourself, he told me one day, what do you think of all that?’ The
French Jesuit could not but have perceived what this invitation from a friend was
possibly echoing and its religious value. Indeed, there is little evidence in calling
upon a connection between this invitation and Jesus’ question to his disciples
about himself: ‘and you, he said to them, what do you think about me?’48 It is the
coincidence of points of view here that constitutes an interesting symbolic challenge:
an invitation from outside, a vox clamans in deserto, a voice coming from the wild-
erness of the unknown; and, on the other side, an expectation, a fides or faith facing
and uncovering the unbelievable rationality of an unknown system, of a revelation.
As Jean-Luc Nancy writes apropos such a mysterious call:
‘The other is called forth to where there is neither subject nor signification. It is the
wilderness of pleasure, or of joy. It is not desolate even if it is arid. It is neither
desolate nor consoled. It is beyond either laughter or tears.
‘– But still, don’t you have to concede – and you seemed to have done so at one
point – that voice is first uttered in tears?
‘– That’s true, that’s the birth of tragedy. But what comes before that birth is the
delivery of voice and it is not yet tragic. Those are tears and cries which know
nothing of tragedy or comedy’ (Mudimbe 1997: 32, quoting Nancy 1993: 246).
Mudimbe remains remarkably aloof in his comments here, not prepared to make a
substantial statement about the forms of African historic religion to which de Rosny
was unmistakably introduced, but instead invoking the unbelievable rationality of
an unknown system (unknown to whom? not to de Rosny anymore, nor to his
Cameroonian interlocutor, but to Mudimbe and the textual genre of North Atlantic
philosophical essay that he pursues), ‘a voice crying in the wilderness’,49 and
Nietzsche’s Birth of tragedy (1872/1930). Mudimbe appears to be prepared to
take recourse to anything, if only it safely belongs to the North Atlantic intellec-
tual canon, and as such can save us from having to think or act beyond the
defective epistemological status of African historic religion, beyond its nature as
certified to be incredible. And at this point in his text, he rushes on to speak of
something else.
Performance is more than the liberation of difference for difference’s sake, it is
the creation of a world which, while man-made and make-believe, yet takes on a
logic and a relevance of its own, reshaping the contingencies of life into a place
48 The unreferenced Bible quotation appears to be slightly corrupt, as befits a Roman
Catholic, especially a Roman Catholic proclaimed agnostic who is a post-clerical intel-
lectual now proclaiming to be agnostic. Cf. Matt 22: 41–42: ‘While the Pharisees were
gathered together, Jesus asked them, 42 Saying, What think ye of Christ? whose son is
he? They say unto him, The son of David.’ So the question was not asked from the dis-
ciples, but from the Pharisees. Or alternatively Acts 13: 25: ‘And as John fulfilled his
course, he said, Whom think ye that I am? I am not he. But, behold, there cometh
one after me, whose shoes of his feet I am not worthy to loose’.
49 Cf. Matt. 3:3: ‘For this is he that was spoken of by the prophet Esaias, saying, The voice
of one crying in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make his paths straight.’
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to inhabit, to cherish, and to heal. Religion is more than a definitional exercise,
more than a defective epistemology believing the incredible: it is the symbolic
transformation through which the locality created by performance is kept alive
so that it may issue life, even in death and through death. And politics is more
than ethnocentric textual comments produced in order to keep North-South
hegemony in place (as Mudimbe defines politics); it is also the parochial struggle
over meaning and resources which make up the smaller, local universe, turning it
into vital locality. African spirituality (cf. van Binsbergen 2003), whether
historic or Christian or Islamic or syncretistic, is a social technology of sociability,
whose forms create meaning, power and healing regardless of the Western epis-
temological status of its alleged dogmas and the supernatural entities features
therein.
Such conversion moves as de Rosny’s and my own go against the course of
hegemonic history, and form a genuine challenge for the self-congratulatory
mildness with which Mudimbe depicts the project of clerical and post-clerical
intellectualism in Central Africa, taking for granted the very impasse in which
he ended up and from which he appears to be incapable of escaping: North Atlantic
academic rationality, and the death of African historic religion.
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Braun, L. 1973. Histoire de l’histoire de la philosophie. Paris: Editions Ophrys.
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de Rosny, E. 1981. Les yeux de ma chèvre: Sur les pas des maı̂tres de la nuit en pays
douala. Paris: Plon.
——. 1992. L’Afrique des guérisons. Paris: Karthala.
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Dumézil, G. 1980. Camillus. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California
Press.
Duran-Ndaya, J. 1999. Rapport de recherche provisionnel. (Internal report, African Studies
Centre, Leiden.)
Eboussi-Boulaga, F. 1981. Christianity without Fetishes: an African Critique and
Recapture of Christianity. New York: Orbis.
Ela, J.-M. 1989. My Faith as an African. New York & London: Orbis.
Fauvelle, F.-X. 1996. L’Afrique de Cheikh Anta Diop. Paris: Karthala.
Fauvelle-Aymar, F.-X., J.-P. Chrétien & C.-H. Perrot (eds.). 2000. Afrocentrismes:
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Lausanne: L’Age d’Homme.
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